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THE IRAQ WAR TWENTY YEARS LATER

NICHOLAS J. SCHLOSSER

BRING THEM UP TO STANDARD

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON HOW THE ARMY HAS WORKED WITH UNQUALIFIED RECRUITS

SANDERS MARBLE

ARMY HISTORY

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF ARMY HISTORY

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

MARK F. AVERILL
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2306103

GARY A. BRITO
General, United States Army
Training and Doctrine Command

Chief of Military History
Charles R. Bowery Jr.

Managing Editor
Bryan J. Hockensmith

Editor
Margaret J. B. McGarry

Layout and Design
Michael R. GIll

Cartographer
Matthew T. Boan

Book Review Editor
Pilar A. Lightfoot

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Cover: Detail of *Satan's Sandbox* by Elzie Golden, 2003
(U.S. Army Art Collection)

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

In the Winter 2023 issue of *Army History*, we are pleased to present two excellent articles, a quality selection of book reviews, an interesting look at some contemporary Army art, and a visit to the Army Women's Museum.

The first article, by Center of Military History historian Nicholas Schlosser, highlights the twentieth anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Schlosser deftly examines the causes of and lead-up to the invasion and then describes the early campaign and drive to Baghdad. After the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime and early conventional military success, the conflict descended into a grueling insurgency. As Schlosser points out, U.S. forces lacked sufficient boots on the ground and were ill-prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the early years of the occupation. He details the eventual troop surge in 2007–2008 and the redefining of the mission for coalition forces, noting that "for the first time since the start of the Iraq War, the Bush administration aligned its goals in Iraq with the combat power necessary to achieve those objectives." Finally, Schlosser analyzes some of the lessons learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom and examines the Army's ability to adapt to a strategic environment that was constantly in flux.

The second article, by Army Medical Department historian Sanders Marble, looks at the history of the Army's use of unqualified recruits. Starting with an examination of the implementation of medical and personality tests during World War I, Marble moves through each successive American conflict detailing the Army's efforts to utilize people that would otherwise be classified as unfit for service. As personnel woes plagued the Army from the World Wars through the Vietnam War, the service increasingly sought ways to "fix" unqualified recruits or lowered its standards to accommodate those who did not pass muster. Marble ends with a brief look at the Army's current recruiting and retention troubles and its programs to address those willing but unable to serve, including remedial physical training and education.

In the middle of this issue, readers will find an interesting Army Art Spotlight, which showcases the work of then Sfc. Juan C. Muñoz. His art captures soldiers as they participate in the 2016 Warrior Games, an event for wounded service members. Also included in this issue is a look at the Army Women's Museum at Fort Lee, Virginia, a facility dedicated to preserving the history of women in the Army.

As I write this, *Army History* is facing challenges in keeping to a timely publication schedule. As many of you are aware, we fell a bit behind over the last year or so due to paper supply issues. We are working to overcome these challenges, and I hope our readers will remain patient as we strive to provide engaging content, despite these obstacles.

BRYAN J. HOCKENSMITH
MANAGING EDITOR

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THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

ARMY HISTORIANS IN A COMPLEX WORLD

The United States Army has both employed and deployed historians to document Army operations since 1944. These historians, whether serving in theaters of conflict as members of military history detachments or assigned to headquarters staffs during peacetime, have produced an unrivaled collection of primary source records of the Army's activities since the end of World War II. This historical program continues today and operates in every place where the Army has a presence. The end of active combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has not reduced the Army's operational tempo. It merely has shifted the Army's operational environments to Europe and Asia and altered the service's activities to presence, advice, support, and training. These operations often occur in a joint and multinational environment, requiring new skills and attributes for Army historians. Two examples of these historical collection efforts demonstrate the agility and flexibility of our historical programs. Maj. Ingrid L. Weissenfluh, an Army Reserve historian assigned to the Military Programs Division in the Field Programs Directorate, recently returned from a short-notice deployment to the Horn of Africa, where she supported United States Africa Command by observing partnership operations, producing point papers and studies in support of engagements, and documenting the activities of joint force units in Eastern Africa. The command in the theater recognized Major Weissenfluh for her superb work, which has resulted not only in better support to allies and partners, but also in significant primary source collections in the form of operational records and oral history interviews. These collections will benefit both the Army and future scholars who will write about these operations.

Army historians are also engaged in important work supporting operations in Eastern Europe, where Army forces continue to demonstrate American resolve in the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine. The Center of Military History (CMH) has used Operation Atlantic Resolve as a capstone training event for military history detachments since 2017, and

(*continued on page 62*)

Steve Frank, command historian for United States Africa Command, discusses small unit leadership in the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne, Belgium, 18 November 2022.

NEWSNOTES

New Publications from CMH

The Center of Military History recently released two new publications. The first, *Army History and Heritage*, is an updated and expanded version of 1998's *American Military Heritage*. Its chapter structure follows that of the galleries of the National Museum of the U.S. Army. It provides an introductory guide to the history of the U.S. Army for junior officers and enlistees. *Army History and Heritage* is a tool for personal and professional development and education. The book includes images, maps, timelines, and a section for soldiers to record their own significant dates and moments of their Army service.

The second publication is *The Army Science Board: A History of Army-Civilian Collaboration in Science*. Early in the Cold War, the Army realized that improving its access to science and engineering expertise in academia and industry was necessary to field forces with a qualitative advantage against the much larger Soviet army. In 1950, the service established the Army Scientific Advisory Panel, which, in 1977, became the Army Science Board. Over the succeeding decades, the organization widened its efforts from a focus on materiel issues to important work on personnel and organizational topics. At the same time, the Army encountered challenges such as the transition to an all-volunteer force, the widespread use of digital devices, and the effects produced by climate change. This publication highlights and honors the women and men who voluntarily contributed their knowledge and skills to assist the Army in defending the nation.

Both publications are available as free PDF downloads on CMH's website, https://history.army.mil. Hard copies are available upon request and through normal channels from the Army Publishing Directorate.

Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, 1945–2022

Lawrence A. Yates, 77, died on 12 October at his home in Overland Park, Kansas. After briefly studying chemical engineering, he changed his college major to history, receiving his bachelor's and master's degrees in that subject from the University of Missouri–Kansas City (UMKC) and his PhD from the University of Kansas in 1981.

During the mid-to-late 1970s, he taught history at UMKC as a visiting instructor while also conducting research at the Harry S. Truman Library for Robert J. Donovan's two-volume history of Truman's presidency. In 1981, Larry accepted a position with the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he researched and wrote history for the U.S. Army and taught at the Army's Command and General Staff College. During his twenty-four years with the institute, he taught and wrote about U.S. military interventions, contingency and stability operations, and unconventional warfare. After retiring from CSI, he began contract work for the U.S. Army Center of Military History in Washington, D.C.

During his employment at CSI and continuing into his retirement, Larry wrote several books for the Army, including one on the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic and two on the intervention in Panama. At the time of his death, he was in the process of editing his completed manuscript on the military action in Somalia.

Larry had a lifetime passion for music. He learned how to play both the banjo and the guitar as a teen and played both right up until his death.

The IRAQ WAR TWENTY Years Later



By Nicholas J. Schlosser

On 21 March 2003, the U.S. Army's V Corps and the I Marine Expeditionary Force, under command of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), crossed the Kuwaiti border and launched a rapid advance north into Iraq. Their mission was to reach Baghdad, depose the country's ruler, Saddam Hussein, and end Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program. The coalition force reached its objective within a matter of weeks. In a dramatic moment at Al Firdos square in the Iraqi capital on 9 April 2003, U.S. Marines toppled a statue of Saddam, marking the symbolic end of his regime. The dictator fled, his government collapsed, and the Iraqi Army dissolved as a cohesive fighting force. On 1 May, U.S. President George W. Bush declared that "major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed."[1]

Despite this assertion, U.S. forces would not withdraw from Iraq until the end of 2011. In the weeks following the arrival of coalition troops in Baghdad in 2003, it became clear that Iraq did not have a stock of weapons of mass destruction: the primary raison d'être for the invasion suddenly had become dubious. Then, during the summer, Iraqis opposed to the occupation began attacking civilian and military targets to snuff out whatever new government the United States and its allies sought to create in place of Saddam's regime. Over the course of the next four years, these isolated attacks evolved into a complex, multifaceted insurgency as different groups sought to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of Saddam's political movement, the Baʿathist Party. It would not be until late 2007 that the United States would be able to degrade the insurgency severely, secure Baghdad, and restore a semblance of order and stability to the country.

Why did it take so long to restore security to Iraq after the initially successful campaign to reach Baghdad? To answer this question, many observers have split the war into two distinct phases—a conventional war followed by a counterinsurgency—and have contended that the Army's initial setbacks in Iraq were because of its lack of experience with irregular warfare and stabilization operations. Soldiers were capable of planning a largescale, conventional campaign against a formally organized enemy force, but floundered when it came to security and stabilization operations. Had the Army been more familiar with irregular warfare, critics have posited, it would have been able to stem the emerging insurgency in 2003 and laid the foundations for a secure and stable Iraq much more quickly.[2]

However, the reality was murkier. The Army was not as institutionally unfamiliar with counterinsurgency as its critics

U.S. military personnel pull down a statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad on 9 April 2003.
Department of Defense

contended—when afforded adequate forces and clear strategic direction, soldiers in 2003 were capable of planning and carrying out effective security and stabilization campaigns.[3] The main challenge confronting U.S. soldiers throughout the Iraq War between the summer of 2003 and the end of 2007 was more fundamental. From the start of the war, the United States did not commit enough resources to achieve its strategic goals. America's wide-ranging objectives required a large-scale force of several hundred thousand soldiers capable of not only defeating the Iraqi Army on the battlefield, but also securing a country of more than thirty million inhabitants. Under Saddam's leadership, the Ba'athist Party had governed Iraq since 1968, and removing it from power produced a myriad of social, economic, and political consequences. The relatively modest force committed by the United States to stabilizing the country after the fall of Saddam was too small to fill the vacuum left in the wake of Iraq's security forces, help rebuild its shattered economy, and midwife the creation of a new political system that balanced the competing interests of Iraq's major religious and ethnic groups. In 2007, when President Bush concluded he needed to commit a surge of forces to restore security in the country, it was the first time the United States reconciled its strategic goals with the resources needed to achieve them.

The 2003 Campaign

President George W. Bush's administration decided to take military action against Iraq within months of al-Qaeda's 11 September 2001 attacks against New York and Washington, D.C.[4] What form that action would take was an open question. However, President Bush and his advisers concluded that Saddam Hussein's regime constituted a clear and present threat to stability in the Middle East. Since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Iraq regularly had thwarted United Nations efforts to monitor its weapons programs. Baghdad repeatedly threatened to launch an invasion of Kuwait and routinely tried to undermine U.S.-led no-fly zone patrols intended to contain its aggressive posture.[5] President Bush, his advisers, and many foreign policy analysts believed that September 11th had transformed the strategic situation in the Middle East and concluded that allowing Saddam to cause disorder and potentially provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorist organizations was a possibility they could not tolerate.[6]

Saddam Hussein
Department of Defense

Although the Bush administration initially pursued a diplomatic course to push Iraq to disarm, it always considered military action a possibility. Thus, at the same time the United States was carrying out operations to destroy al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was planning an offensive against Iraq. The combatant command, responsible for all U.S. military activities in southwest Asia, already had drawn up a contingency plan in the event of another war with Iraq. However, it was ill-suited to the Bush administration's overall objectives. Whereas a basic assumption of CENTCOM's initial plan—code-named 1003–98—was that Iraq would be the aggressor state, President Bush intended to launch a preemptive strike against Saddam's regime. Critically, his administration called for using only a relatively small force of about 125,000 troops—far below the 500,000 that CENTCOM believed would be necessary to invade and secure Iraq.[7]

Although the United States already had fought a war with Iraq—to liberate Kuwait in 1991 after Saddam had attempted to annex it in 1990—Bush and his advisers believed the previous conflict would bear little resemblance to the forthcoming campaign. Operation Desert Storm—the code name for the 1991 campaign—had been a large-scale effort involving a massive international coalition of countries from across Europe and the Arab world. The U.S. troop commitment was more than 500,000, with 296,000 coming from the Army. Along with ample aviation assets from the Air Force and Navy, the U.S. ground force that ultimately drove Iraqi forces from Kuwait consisted of seven Army divisions and two Marine Corps divisions. Arraying this amount of combat power in the Middle East took five months, and the ground war offensive was preceded by a months-long heavy bombing campaign against Iraq's military forces and infrastructure. The ultimate ground offensive lasted just a little longer than four days.[8] Nevertheless, the time and resources needed to achieve victory had been considerable. Some of Bush's advisers believed that this substantial commitment had been excessive and concluded the Americans could have achieved the same strategic results with far fewer troops.[9]

General Franks
Department of Defense

Among these advisers was Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, who subscribed to the theory of the revolution in military affairs (RMA). The coalition's overwhelming victory in Operation Desert Storm convinced him and many other analysts that a new warfighting paradigm had emerged. Technological innovations such as smart weapons, global positioning systems, and networks had, according to RMA's adherents, transformed basic principles of war. Thanks to these new developments, America's armed forces no longer needed massive commitments of troops sustained by extensive logistical trains to overwhelm and defeat their opponents.[10]

Rumsfeld concluded that the United States only needed about 125,000 to 150,000 soldiers to defeat Iraq. This posed a range of challenges for CENTCOM's commander, General Tommy R. Franks, as he would have only a fraction of the forces that his predecessor, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., had in 1991. At the same time, Franks's mission was far more expansive and open-ended. Whereas Schwarzkopf had a focused objective—drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait—Franks would have to defeat the Iraqi military, depose Saddam Hussein's government, and secure a country that was larger than California and had a population of about 25 million, ensuring that none of the former regime supporters could abscond with weapons of mass destruction.

Secretary Rumsfeld
U.S. Army

To compensate for this reduction in forces, CENTCOM planners emphasized surprise and speed over mass and firepower. The United States would dispense with a preliminary air offensive. Instead, ground forces would strike as soon as President Bush gave the order to commence hostilities. This decision presented planners with another set of challenges. Massing a force of 150,000 in Kuwait would take time and resources, which would significantly diminish the element of surprise. Consequently, CENTCOM's staff considered an approach known as a running start in which the United States launched its offensive before all of its forces were actually in theater. Over the course of the next year, Franks and Rumsfeld continually revised the CENTCOM offensive plan, gradually whittling down the force numbers. The numbers and complicated manner in which forces would enter the theater unnerved a number of individuals in the Bush administration. When Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who had been chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Gulf War, expressed concern in September 2002 about the small force size being proposed for the offensive, General Franks replied, "We are moving into a new strategic and operational paradigm here." He added, "By applying military mass simultaneously at key points, rather than trying to push a broad, slow conventional advance, we throw the enemy off balance."

Franks summed up his approach by stating, "Speed and momentum are the keys."[11]

Powell was not the only senior leader who had misgivings about the number of forces Rumsfeld planned to commit to Iraq. During a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 25 February 2003, Senator Carl M. Levin asked Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki how many troops the United States would need to occupy Iraq. The general replied:

> I would say that what has been mobilized to this point, something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers, is probably a figure that would be required. We are talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that is fairly significant with the ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. It takes a significant ground force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment to make sure that people are fed, that water is distributed—all the normal responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like this.[12]

The Army chief of staff's estimate prompted an immediate reply from senior Defense Department leaders. Two days later, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz said to the House Budget Committee, "I am reasonably certain that [the Iraqis] will greet us as liberators, and that will help us to keep requirements down." He added that "we can say with reasonable confidence that the notion of hundreds of thousands of American troops is way off the mark."[13] It was a remarkably public rebuke of the Army's senior officer.

Thus, many American leaders went into Iraq firm in the belief that the United States' military's technological superiority would offset the limited number of soldiers and marines they planned to commit on the battlefield. This made sense as long as American strategic goals were focused and achievable with the smaller force. Unfortunately, they were neither. According to the final version of CENTCOM's Iraq operation plan—1003V—the purpose of the campaign against Iraq was "to force the collapse of the Iraqi regime and deny it the use of [weapons of mass destruction] to threaten its neighbors and U.S./Coalition interests as part of the Global War on Terrorism."[14] The focus of the operation was to rapidly defeat Saddam's military forces. Three divisions—the 3d Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, and the 1st Marine Division—would cross the Kuwaiti border and make a rapid dash to Iraq's capital. The plan emphasized that "Baghdad is the symbol of power, and every opportunity must be taken to control it as quickly as possible in order to sever its control over the remaining military/security forces and the population."[15] At the same time, special operations forces would seize Scud missile launchers in western Iraq and launch an incursion into the country's northern regions, focusing on the pro-American Kurdish autonomous region.

General Franks's plan was ambitious, but hardly the paradigm shift he claimed it was. For all the talk of "shock and awe" and utilizing "overwhelming force across all lines of operation," the ultimate objective of CENTCOM's plan remained the capture of the enemy's capital, the critical goal of countless Western military campaigns for centuries.[16] Seizing Baghdad, planners believed, would generate critical follow-on effects—the collapse of the regime and the breakdown of the Iraqi military's command-and-control functions—that would bring the campaign to a quick and decisive end.

The task of seizing the capital fell to Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan's CFLCC. McKiernan's main effort consisted of two corps-sized forces—Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace's V Corps and Lt. Gen. James T. Conway's I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). In order to make the 500-kilometer advance from Kuwait's border north to Baghdad as quickly as possible, McKiernan planned to assault the capital along two axes on either side of the Euphrates River—V Corps advancing on the western side as I MEF guarded General Wallace's right flank. This would allow V Corps' main ground unit, Maj. Gen. Buford C. Blount's 3d Infantry Division, to bypass the major population centers in Iraq's south, secure the major cities of An Najaf and Karbala', and then advance on Baghdad from the southwest. The I MEF's 1st Marine Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. James N. Mattis, planned to strike toward Baghdad from the east. Upon reaching the capital's limits, the two forces would establish a cordon around the city, preventing leaders from escaping with weapons of mass destruction.[17]

General Shinseki
U.S. Army

CENTCOM intended to leverage American superiority in speed, maneuverability, and precision against its Iraqi opponents. However, its approach was marred by an imbalance between means and ends. Peter R. Mansoor, a veteran and historian of the Iraq War, observed that "beneath the shiny veneer of victory in the spring of 2003 lay fundamental issues concerning force structure, doctrine, and strategic outlook that would haunt the U.S. Army in the aftermath of major combat operations."[18] General Franks was certainly aware that the United States would need to participate in reconstruction efforts of some kind after the collapse of Saddam's government. Yet, his plan laid out an extraordinarily grandiose end state: "Returning control of a stable Iraq to a broad-based government representing all ethnic, religious, and tribal groups will add stability to the region and support the fight on the Global War on Terrorism."[19]

The plan provided little detail on how the United States would achieve this fundamental transformation of Iraq from a totalitarian regime into a pluralistic, Western-style, liberal democracy. CENTCOM committed enough forces to reach Baghdad but not enough to rebuild a country of 25 million inhabitants who had been battered by decades of living under a dictatorship and economic sanctions. Observed Mansoor, "While the arguments of [RMA] advocates for smaller, more nimble, and better-networked ground forces were valid on the tactical and operational levels of war, they largely

ignored the purposes for which wars are fought and how wars are really won in the aftermath of fighting. Large numbers of troops would be required on post-conflict operations to stabilize shattered societies and rebuild deposed governments."[20]

For a number of reasons, however, planners underestimated the scope and challenge of the task they were about to undertake. Faith in the concepts of RMA and the United States' overwhelming conventional combat superiority was one factor. Second, planners assumed that the task of removing the Baʿathists from power and replacing them with a stable, functioning government could be achieved in a fairly orderly fashion. However, this assumption misunderstood the nature of Saddam's regime and Iraqi society as a whole. The country was a complex, ethnoreligious mosaic comprised of multiple communities. About two-thirds of its population were Shi'a Muslims. One third was Sunni Muslims, divided between Arab and Kurd communities.

The Sunni Arab–dominated Baʿathists occupied one of many centers of power in the country. This did not mean that Saddam (a Sunni Arab) was able to exercise power without making accommodations with the various ethnic and religious groups in the country. In Al Anbar Province, for example, Saddam had to make accommodations with tribal leaders so that he could maintain authority over the region. Although influential Shi'a clerics such as Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Husayni al-Sistani were kept in check by the Baʿathist regime, they nevertheless held considerable sway over the country's Shi'a population and ultimately would become major power brokers in any post-Saddam order. The country's Sunni minority long had enjoyed ascendency, and, therefore, any kind of democratic system would weaken their primacy in the country, threatening to alienate a large swath of Iraqi society.[21] A third factor was the strong influence of anti-Saddam Iraqi exiles—most notably Ahmed Chalabi—who ingratiated themselves with a number of senior U.S. Defense Department officials, including Wolfowitz, Douglas J. Feith, and Richard N. Perle. Chalabi, a secular Shi'a politician who led the Iraqi National Congress, had fled Iraq in 1958 and had little real experience with the country as it was in 2003. Yet he was able to take advantage of the sparse intelligence available to the United States on conditions inside Iraq to convince senior American leaders that Saddam's regime was likely to fall easily and the United States would be able to install a stable, pro-U.S. government without much difficulty.[22]



Following a multimonth diplomatic campaign in which the United States tried to convince Saddam to disarm voluntarily, on 17 March 2003, President Bush delivered an ultimatum demanding the Iraqi dictator and his two sons depart Iraq within forty-eight hours. On 19 March, the coalition launched a surgical air strike against a target in southern Baghdad, where intelligence reports indicated—incorrectly—that Saddam was hiding in a safehouse. The next day, coalition forces stormed across Iraq's frontier with Kuwait and began advancing north. In terms of number of countries, the coalition was large, with thirty-seven nations contributing forces to the effort. Nevertheless, it lacked the diplomatic and strategic heft of the Gulf War alliance. Soldiers from only four of the coalition allies—Great Britain, Australia, Poland, and Ukraine—participated in the offensive itself, with most allied states contributing forces for the stability and peacekeeping efforts following Saddam's fall. Most of the troop contributions were also relatively small, with only seven members of the coalition sending more than 1,000 troops to Iraq.[23] Another NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) ally, Turkey, refused to allow U.S. forces to transit the country to open a northern front against Iraq.

The assault was rapid, and, within a matter of weeks, American forces reached the outskirts of Baghdad. The advance did not proceed without incident. U.S. troops encountered resistance in An Nasiriyah and As Samawah from irregular Fedayeen forces. The Fedayeen surprised the Americans with their tenacity, aggressiveness, and skill as guerrilla fighters. Following his command's initial engagements with them, V Corps commander, General Wallace, observed: "The enemy we're fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against, because of these paramilitary forces."[24] Even some of Iraq's conventional forces proved formidable. An attempt to destroy the Medina Republican Guard Division, launched by the Headquarters and Headquarters Company,

General McKiernan
Third Army, U.S. Central Command

11th Aviation Group, on 24 March, failed to locate the Iraqi unit and ended with one helicopter shot down, its crew captured, and almost all of the thirty helicopters involved in the attack damaged.[25] Later that day, a sandstorm swept across southern Iraq, grounding aircraft, halting convoys, and slowing the coalition's advance. Despite these setbacks, however, V Corps and I MEF were able to recommence their advance a few days later.

The 3d Infantry Division took Baghdad's International Airport on 3 April 2003. Although General Wallace originally had planned to surround the city, launch raids to probe defenses, and gradually wear down resistance, the 3d Infantry Division's commander, General Blount, believed he had an opportunity to strike a more decisive blow against Baghdad's defenses. The division had encountered little opposition as it approached the capital, and the Iraqis had left many of the critical avenues of approach into the city undefended. Blount ordered his 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, commanded by Col. David G. Perkins, to launch a reconnaissance in force straight through the center of the city's densely populated southern neighborhoods. The heavy raid, or "Thunder Run," allowed the coalition to acquire a better sense of Baghdad's internal defenses and served as a demonstration of force to the Iraqis. The first such raid, conducted on 5 April, encountered



A U.S. Marine Corps Humvee from the 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion weathers an Iraqi sandstorm during the advance on Baghdad on 26 March 2003.
U.S. Marine Corps

fierce resistance from irregular fighters, but Perkins's brigade was able to punch through enemy small arms fire and rockets. Perkins launched a second thunder run on 7 April, this time moving north into Baghdad's central government district.[26]

Meanwhile, the 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, seized the major crossings over the Tigris River north of Baghdad, encountering fierce resistance from Iraqi Republican Guard and irregular fighters. As the 3d Infantry Division fought to take western Baghdad, General Mattis's 1st Marine Division advanced on the capital from the east on 6 April. By 9 April, the Baʿathists had lost control of the city, and Saddam Hussein fled into hiding. Iraqis took to the streets in celebration. Although large parts of northern and western Iraq remained outside coalition control, CFLCC had accomplished its goal of reaching Baghdad and toppling the Baʿathist regime.

The fall of Baghdad did not bring an end to the war, however. While conventional resistance to the American forces began to dissipate and Saddam fled the city, mass looting broke out across the capital on 11 April. Baghdad's residents quickly became frustrated by the coalition's inability to restore security and basic services or prevent large-scale theft of personal property. The collapse of public order also damaged the standing of the coalition before the occupation even had begun.[27] It was the first sign that although CFLCC had enough combat power to reach Baghdad, surround it, and even traverse it, it did not have enough to secure the Iraqi capital and restore civil order. Critically, the bulk of McKiernan's forces only held about a third of the country. Thus, when he received two new divisions—the 82d Airborne Division and the 4th Infantry Division—he deployed them to the western Al Anbar Province and to the northern Salah ad Din Province, respectively. The 101st Airborne Division, which had protected the 3d Infantry Division's left flank during the advance on Baghdad, moved further north to Ninawa Province and Iraq's third largest city, Mosul.

Even though U.S. units were still engaged in combat across Iraq, many analysts, politicians, and commentators concluded that the Iraq War was over. President Bush's 1 May 2003 speech aboard the USS *Abraham Lincoln* was a decisive declaration that the United States was commencing postconflict, reconstruction efforts. Many Iraqis, however, saw the situation differently.

U.S. Army M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks from 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, under the Victory Arch in central Baghdad in November 2003
U.S. Air Force

The War Continues: 2003-2006

Bush's declaration that "major combat operations" were over drew a clear line in the sand, even though the coalition was still fighting remnants of the Baʿathist regime.[28] Underscoring this, the Pentagon transformed McKiernan's CFLCC into the Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) shortly after, emphasizing that it now would focus on reconstruction operations.[29] Additionally, General Franks made the decision to retire, meaning that CENTCOM would be under a new commander—General John P. Abizaid—beginning in July. Although the fighting gradually was taking the form of an organized insurgency, Rumsfeld dismissed continuing attacks as those of "pockets of dead-enders" in June.[30]

The first histories of the war reinforced the idea that the "fall" of Baghdad in 2003 was a finale rather than an entr'acte. One of the Army's initial assessments of the conflict ended its account abruptly, stating: "The president of the United States declared major combat operations over on 1 May 2003, thus this study is limited to those operations occurring on or before 1 May 2003."[31] Although the study's authors acknowledged the war was ongoing, the chief of staff's directive framed the period from 21 March 2003 to 1 May 2003 as a discreet campaign with a clearly defined beginning and end.

Esteemed historians such as Robert Scales, Williamson Murray, and John Keegan reinforced this conception. In 2003, Keegan wrote of the war in the past tense, observing that "some wars begin badly. Some end badly. The Iraq War of 2003 was exceptional in both beginning well for the Anglo-American force that waged it and ending victoriously." In an even more astounding statement, Keegan claimed that "the war was not only successful but peremptorily short, lasting only twenty-one days, from 20 March to 9 April. Campaigns so brief are rare, a lightning campaign so complete in its results almost unprecedented."[32]

The reality was messier. By deposing Saddam's regime, the United States–led coalition dramatically altered the strategic situation in Iraq and the Middle East. Overnight, Iraq had devolved from a dictatorship dominated by its Sunni minority into a country in which multiple parties, tribes, sects, and other groups sought to assert their rights, protect their prerogatives, and consolidate power within whatever new order would replace the prior regime. Iraq's neighbors, namely Syria and Iran, eagerly exploited the situation for their own ends. Even the United States was not sure what the new government would look like.

The Bush administration initially had created an agency called the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance to oversee the occupation and help rebuild the country. The office began operations in Iraq on 21 April only to be supplanted by a brand-new agency, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), less than three weeks later. Believing that the unstable situation

President Bush declares the end of major combat operations in Iraq on the deck of the USS *Abraham Lincoln*.
U.S. Navy

needed to be righted quickly, the CPA's head, L. Paul Bremer III, sought to assert his authority aggressively over the country with a series of sweeping directives. The first purged Iraq's civil service of all employees who were senior members of the Ba'athist Party—a figure that numbered in the tens of thousands. Instead of creating order, Bremer's decree caused confusion, alienated scores of Iraqis from the coalition authorities, and crippled the normal operations of many of Iraqi administrative organs. The second CPA order dissolved the Iraqi armed forces. Now, more than half a million Iraqi men were out of work and no longer able to provide for their families, living in a country undergoing severe economic, political, and social dislocation.[33]

General Sanchez
U.S. Army

Ironically, at the same time it was expanding its civil control of Iraq, the Bush administration was taking steps to reduce its military strength in the country. Even before the start of offensive operations, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had begun redeploying units slated for Iraq, redirecting the 1st Cavalry Division to South Korea in February 2003.[34] I MEF and its component units returned to the United States that summer. On 15 June, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez's V Corps assumed responsibility for CJTF-7, and CFLCC redeployed. Whereas before, the equivalent of a field army headquarters had overseen military operations in Iraq, they now fell to a much smaller corps-sized element.

Insurgent groups started striking with greater force throughout the summer. What began as a sporadic series of random attacks soon grew into a coordinated campaign targeting critical infrastructure and institutions. One of the most devastating bombings occurred on 19 August, when a truck bomb smashed into a United Nations compound and killed twenty-two people. In response, the United Nations withdrew the bulk of its personnel from the country, placing even more of the burden for economic and civil reconstruction on the CPA and American forces.[35]

Coalition leaders concluded that fighting would continue until Saddam and his two sons were either captured or killed. A joint special operations task force and soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division located Uday and Qusay Hussein on 22 July 2003 at a safe house in Mosul and killed the two senior Iraqi leaders when they refused to surrender. Saddam was able to avoid capture longer but ultimately was located and captured near Tikrit on 13 December in an operation carried out by special operators and the 4th Infantry Division. Unfortunately, Saddam's capture did not lead to a drop in violence across Iraq.

Meanwhile, soldiers were confronting the challenges of carrying out security and other occupation duties with limited forces. In one example, military police stationed at Abu Ghraib prison abused detainees, subjecting them to physical harm and sexual humiliation during the fall of 2003. When photos of the crimes became public in April 2004, they sparked outrage in the United States, Iraq, and around the world. One image of a hooded Iraqi prisoner forced to stand on a box with cables strapped to his hands became one of the emblematic images of the war. Subsequent investigations determined that, although only a small number of soldiers were responsible, the incidents nevertheless were a consequence,

partly, of the fact that one Military Police battalion was carrying out a mission normally performed by two.[36] "Abu Ghraib represented a devastating setback for America's efforts in Iraq," General Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander of special operations forces in Iraq, later observed.[37]

In 2004, the threat situation in Iraq became more complex. Rather than just small groups of Baʿathists seeking to regain power, the insurgency transformed into a multifaceted collection of different groups fighting to achieve a range of objectives. Many were not even interested in restoring the Baʿathists to power. While groups of Sunni resistance fighters sought to drive out the coalition, some insurgents, such as tribal militias in Al Anbar Province, sought to protect their power and privileges in the region. Meanwhile, more radical fundamentalist groups aimed to overturn Iraq's entire secular order and create a theocracy. The most prominent of these fundamentalist groups was a movement led by Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi called *Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad* (Group of Monotheism and Jihad). In 2004, Zarqawi transformed his group into a franchise of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, naming it al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).[38] As Sunni resistance groups multiplied, Shi'a militias became more aggressive, acquiring arms to defend themselves. The most prominent of these was the Mahdi Army led by cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The son of a prominent critic of Saddam—whom the dictator executed in 1999—Sadr was powerful enough to take control of Baghdad's sprawling slum district of Sadr City and parts of the holy city of An Najaf.

Both insurgent groups and militias relied on a variety of tactics to offset the coalition's superior firepower, training, technology, and organization. Ambushes using small arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades were common. Most lethal, however, was the improvised explosive device (IED). Cheap and easy to build, the weapons were usually no more advanced than a repurposed shell fitted with a basic triggering device. Insurgents buried them along coalition convoy routes, in markets and squares where large numbers of civilians gathered, and other locations where they could inflict heavy casualties. Americans' primary utility vehicle, the Humvee, with its wide chassis sitting low to the ground, was particularly vulnerable to these rudimentary weapons.[39]

An IED explodes in southern Baghdad on 14 April 2005.
U.S. Army

On 31 March 2004, Sunni insurgents murdered four American security contractors in Al Fallujah. Images of the victims' bodies hanging from a span over the Euphrates River sparked outrage and prompted the Bush administration to order U.S. forces to take control of the city, long a stronghold for the insurgency. The 1st Marine Division launched an offensive on 4 April and immediately encountered heavy resistance from Sunni insurgents. Iraqi units, recently raised and trained by the United States, mutinied and refused to support the assault. Many civilians also died in the fighting, sparking outrage on the part of senior Iraqi leaders, who demanded Bremer call off the attack. The CPA suspended the offensive on 9 April, leaving the city effectively in the hands of the insurgent forces. At the same time, the United States decided to take a more aggressive stand against Sadr and his political movement, sparking a Shi'a uprising. Militias in Sadr City and predominantly Shi'a cities across southern Iraq launched their own attacks against coalition forces.

Thus, a year after the fall of Baghdad, the coalition was still fighting to secure parts of the country. Nevertheless, the CPA continued to move forward with plans to turn control of the country over to an Iraqi interim government by the end of June 2004. Recognizing that the country was far from secure or stable, the Defense Department replaced CJTF-7 with three new headquarters—Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I), Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I), and the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq. The Pentagon's decision to reorganize drastically the coalition headquarters marked a turning point in the U.S. campaign in Iraq. It was a clear acknowledgment that U.S. planners had misconceived the nature of the conflict after the fall of Saddam. The war had not ended in May 2003 but had transformed into a series of insurgencies requiring a robust response on the part of the United States. This was no longer an occupation focused on mopping up former regime stragglers but a large-scale counterinsurgency campaign.

On 1 July 2004, General George W. Casey Jr. replaced General Sanchez as the coalition commander in Iraq.[40] Casey had served as an assistant division commander during U.S. peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the mid-1990s. Afterward, he worked on the Joint Staff and then served as the vice chief of staff of the Army. Upon taking command of MNF-I, General Casey instilled a sense of focus and direction in the U.S. effort in Iraq that had been missing over the previous year. He established a new campaign plan focusing on creating a stable, secure environment in which Iraq could conduct a series of elections that would create a constituent assembly, elect a new national assembly, and establish a working, parliamentary system of government.[41] Casey's first order of business,

General Casey, commander of MNF-I, answers a reporter's question during a press conference on 11 October 2006.
Department of Defense

however, was putting down the Sunni and Shi'a rebellions in Al Fallujah and An Najaf, respectively.

The battle for An Najaf, a holy city revered by Shi'a Muslims, occurred in August 2004, as Army and Marine units defeated the Mahdi Army.[42] The Second Battle of Fallujah followed in November. The coalition's first attempt to take the city in April 2004 had ended in stalemate. Consequently, Casey committed a much more substantial force for the fall offensive. The 1st Marine Division now commanded two Marine regimental combat teams and an Army brigade. They were supported by aviation assets from the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing and combat support enablers. The battle was one of the largest in the Iraq War and lasted more than six weeks. The United States lost 82 killed in action and more than 600 wounded in action. Insurgent losses amounted to at least 2,000 killed and 1,200 captured.[43] By the end of the year, the coalition began reintroducing civilians into the city.

General Casey thus had cause for optimism throughout 2005. Iraqis went to the polls to vote for the National Assembly in January 2005. Despite a widespread Sunni boycott, the elections largely were successful and held promise that Iraq's path to democracy would not be as rocky as feared. The Bush administration and MNF-I subsequently commenced a new strategy based on transitioning the security mission from U.S. and coalition forces to newly trained Iraqi units. "As the Iraqis stand up, we stand down," President Bush declared on 28 June 2005.[44] The coalition's ultimate objective was to establish an "Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror[ism], with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists."[45] The new Iraqi security forces—its army and national police—would be the foundation for this strategy.

To achieve these objectives, coalition forces would need to continue to fight the Sunni insurgency, diminish the power and influence of the Shi'a militias, continue to



develop the new Iraqi democracy, rebuild the country's physical infrastructure, and recruit, train, and organize an effective security force loyal to the new government. Furthermore, MNF-I would need to do all of this while the Pentagon continued to draw down the number of U.S. forces in the country. Meanwhile, the leaders of the Army and Marine Corps were growing concerned about the strain that multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan were placing on the all-volunteer force. Increasingly, the Defense Department deployed National Guard and reserve component units to reinforce the active component's share in the security mission, adding more pressure to the total force. The commander of the Army Reserve, Lt. Gen. James R. Helmly, feared the constant deployments were turning the component into a "broken force."[46]

Nevertheless, the coalition was able to make uneven but steady progress. In September 2005, Col. Herbert R. McMaster's 3d Armored Cavalry conducted a methodical, deliberate, and successful security offensive against Sunni insurgent groups in the northern city of Tall 'Afar. After clearing it of enemy fighters, the unit maintained a permanent presence inside the city, protecting the people and preventing insurgents from returning.[47] The Marine Corps' Regimental Combat Team 2 carried out a similar operation in the western border town of Al Qa'im, establishing small combat outposts across the area to disrupt insurgent activity. Critically, the marines also forged an alliance with local tribal groups against AQI and other Sunni insurgents. Meanwhile, the Iraqi government oversaw two critical elections—the first to approve the new constitution in October and the second for a new parliament in December. Both proceeded without major outbreaks of violence.[48]

The year 2005 did not proceed without setbacks. On 19 November, a squad from the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, killed twenty-four civilians in the town of Hadithah following an IED attack on the unit.[49] After an investigation into the event, the MNC-I commander, Lt. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, noted that although the majority of U.S. units in Iraq performed their duties "in an exemplary manner every day," the Hadithah killings demonstrated the level to which "pressures and day-to-day realities of counterinsurgencies tend to magnify organizational weaknesses."[50] U.S. forces needed to "always look for ways to minimize injury to civilians rather than accepting civilian casualties as a regrettable, but inevitable cost of the mission."[51]

Soldiers from the 1st Cavalry Division prepare to clear a building in Al Fallujah during the second battle for that city on 12 November 2004.
U.S. Army

Throughout 2005, coalition operations uncovered increasing numbers of insurgent weapons caches. During the fall, the number of IED detonations, small arms attacks, and other security incidents slowly declined.[52] Iraq had conducted three successful elections and had laid the foundation for a new, democratic system of government. The coalition still had a long way to go, but it seemed to be moving along the right track.

An insurgent strike against a Shi'a mosque in early 2006 dashed these hopes. The target was the al-Askari mosque in Samarra', roughly 120 kilometers north of Baghdad. One of the holiest shrines for Shi'a Muslims, the mosque's destruction on 22 February sparked a dramatic escalation of sectarian violence across Iraq that lasted throughout 2006 and well into 2007. Between February and December 2006, the coalition witnessed an 87 percent increase in civilian deaths and a 70 percent jump in the number of small arms fire attacks, bombings, and other major incidents.[53] As al-Qaeda in Iraq and other Sunni insurgent groups attempted to drive the Shi'a from their neighborhoods, the Shi'a enlisted the aid of militias such as the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organization to defend them. AQI also ramped up attempts to establish a fundamentalist theocracy in Al Anbar Province. Both sides carried out ethnic cleansing campaigns that transformed once mixed-sect neighborhoods into strictly Sunni or Shi'a communities.

The Iraq War quickly transformed into three to four different conflicts, some of which no longer even involved the United States or the coalition. There was the long-running Sunni nationalist insurgency. Sunni insurgents were also locked in battle with one another, as AQI sought to radicalize and theocratize the movement. AQI also launched a war against the tribes in Al Anbar Province in an attempt to break sheikhs' authority over the region and wrest control over the local economy. Meanwhile, the Shi'a-Sunni sectarian war threatened to plunge Iraq into a broader civil war.

This placed numerous strains on U.S. forces as they struggled to protect the population, patrol hostile areas, and conduct civil affairs operations. General Chiarelli, believing that the insurgency was driven largely by Iraq's economic problems, planned to pursue a campaign emphasizing reconstruction, civil improvements, and the expansion of employment opportunities. However, he needed to carry out this campaign as the Defense Department pressured him to drawdown the U.S combat footprint in Iraq. Senior leaders such as General Abizaid were convinced that the very presence of U.S. forces in Iraq was driving the insurgency.[54] However, with fewer

Soldiers from the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment on patrol with Iraqi security forces in Tall 'Afar on 11 September 2005
U.S. Navy

units available, MNF-I was forced to emphasize security in some areas of Iraq and allow others to fall to insurgent forces. Thus, while the 4th Infantry Division concentrated on securing Baghdad, it could send only limited units to the strategically important districts outside of the capital known as the belts.

This approach took its toll on security and discipline. In the southern belt town of Yusifiyah, four soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment, gang-raped and murdered Abeer Qassim Hamza, a fourteen-year-old Iraqi girl, on 12 March 2006. They also killed three other members of her family and attempted to cover up the war crimes. In June, AQI insurgents based in the area retaliated against the platoon. They initially killed one soldier and kidnapped, tortured, and then murdered two more, declaring the actions were "revenge for our sister who was dishonored by a soldier of the same brigade."[55] Both Sunni and Shi'a militant groups carried out attacks in Hamza's name over the course of the next year.[56]

Near Samarra', soldiers from the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, murdered three Iraqi detainees in May 2006. General Chiarelli saw the murders as indicative of deep-seated problems within 3d Brigade's chain of command. These murders also revealed conflicting ideas of how the Americans should be prosecuting the war. The 3d Brigade's commander, Col. Michael D. Steele, had inculcated an aggressive mindset within his soldiers, and Chiarelli saw a direct link between Steele's command posture and the deaths. During a formal reprimand on 11 July 2006, the MNC-I commander stated that Steele's "acts, omissions, and personal example have created a command climate where irresponsible behavior appears to have been allowed to go unchecked."[57] The United States, Chiarelli believed, needed to focus on helping the Iraqis; war crimes such as those in Yusifiyah and Samarra' provoked retaliatory attacks and led Iraqis to distrust the Americans, aid the insurgency, and join the broader effort to drive out the coalition forces.[58]

The American-led coalition now faced the possibility of strategic defeat if it did not alter course. But the dilemma confronting Chiarelli, his superior General Casey, and decision makers in Washington was not one with a clear-cut answer. Withdrawing troops might reduce attacks on coalition forces, but it would allow strong militant groups such as AQI and the Mahdi Army to assert control over the Iraqi government and people. Escalating the U.S. commitment might exacerbate the threat situation, provoke more attacks, and increase U.S. and Iraqi casualties alike.

Turning Point: The Surge

The summer of 2006 was a grim period in Iraq. It was also when the war began to turn in favor of the Iraqi government and coalition. On 7 June 2006, a special operations task force located and killed AQI's leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In the spite of this loss, the insurgent group launched a large-scale campaign to drive the Shi'a from Baghdad just a few months later. Code-named *The Lion of the Two Rivers*, the offensive was an ambitious, multimonth effort, beginning in August and lasting until October 2006, during which AQI planned to secure the belt districts and then drive into Baghdad itself. In response, the Mahdi Army rallied its forces and bludgeoned AQI, forcing the group to withdraw and consolidate in Sunni neighborhoods. The Shi'a militia then launched its own cleansing operations, driving Sunnis from mixed-sect neighborhoods and leaving AQI in disarray. By the end of 2006, the Sunni insurgency group was unable to "project sufficient combat power to negate Shi'a territorial gains and undertake a Sunni sectarian clearing of [the] Shi'a from Baghdad."[59]

AQI confronted setbacks in regions it had once considered safe havens. In September, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha and other tribal leaders in Al Anbar Province's capital city of Ar Ramadi approached Col. Sean B. MacFarland's 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, and offered to forge an alliance to fight AQI. Sattar and his confederates were no friends of the coalition or of the government in Baghdad, but AQI's aggressive attempts to break the power of the tribes in Al Anbar had alienated many traditional elites in the province and led them to conclude that the coalition was the lesser of two evils.[60] In exchange for coalition funds and support, the young men in Ar Ramadi's tribes

Secretary Gates
U.S. Army

enrolled in the local police forces, ceased supporting AQI, and ultimately rendered the city and province hostile territory to AQI and other radical Sunni groups. The tribal leaders dubbed their resistance movement the Al Anbar Awakening. Violence in the province began to drop dramatically. In response to these setbacks, AQI attempted to right its ship. Having assumed control of most of the other Sunni insurgent groups, AQI's leadership rebranded itself the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), in an attempt to emphasize its Iraqi character and counter assertions that foreign fighters dominated its leadership.[61]

It is a testament to just how much the fog of war can cloud an observer's vision that, just as ISI[62] was facing significant defeats, many senior leaders in the coalition saw signs that the United States was on the verge of losing the war. In August, the intelligence chief for the senior coalition headquarters in Al Anbar Province declared that "the social and political situation has deteriorated to a point that MNF [multi-national forces] and ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] are no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in Al Anbar."[63] A congressionally convened Iraq study group also concluded in December 2006 that the United States needed to rethink its approach to the conflict radically, observing that Casey's summer offensive to secure Baghdad using predominantly Iraqi troops had been largely a failure. (Ironically, it is this offensive that helped repel AQI's *The Lion of the Two Rivers* offensive).[64] The fact also remained that, although ISI had suffered setbacks, sectarian violence continued to engulf Iraq. In November, more than 3,000 Iraqi civilians died in the fighting. The following month, the number was more than 3,500.[65] U.S. and allied losses were also mounting. Since the start of the war, more than 3,000 coalition soldiers had been killed in action, 2,000 of whom were from the U.S. Army. During the first half of 2006, 380 coalition soldiers had died in action. Between July and December 2006, 493 were killed.[66]

Consequently, President Bush's decisions to launch a surge of forces in 2007 and to replace General Casey with General David H. Petraeus as commander in Iraq came at a critical moment. Casey had been an effective commander, helping to organize MNF-I into a robust headquarters that oversaw and coordinated the coalition's vast responsibilities and functions. He also laid out a comprehensive strategy of transition that effectively reconciled the Bush administration's rather lofty objectives with the limited forces at his disposal. However, his overall conception of the war as a stabilization operation and his firm belief that too much U.S. assistance threatened the transition effort did not align with either the situation on the ground or with President Bush's own estimation of the conflict. Throughout 2006, Bush had pressed both official and unofficial advisers for a new way forward in Iraq. Casey remained committed to the transition strategy. Later, he recollected, "I should have directly offered the president a broader range of options for achieving our objectives in Iraq."[67]

One option Bush considered was to add more American troops to Iraq. The lack of adequate forces in the country had been a perennial problem confronting U.S. planners since the 2003 invasion. During the summer and fall of 2006, the National Security Council, informal advisers, and senior commanders in the Army began devising plans that combined slowing down the transition approach, expanding the U.S. force, and committing those forces to a new strategy focusing on protecting Iraqi civilians from the insurgency. In Iraq, many division and brigade commanders were planning large-scale counterinsurgency campaigns modeled on those executed in Al Qa'im and Tall 'Afar—campaigns requiring significant numbers of soldiers.

After weeks of deliberations, President Bush decided to deploy a "surge" of five brigades to Iraq.[68] The deployment would entail more than just sending more troops, however—a point Bush made when he announced the new strategy on 10 January 2007: "Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs." He went on to assert that, "in earlier operations, Iraqi and American forces cleared many neighborhoods of terrorists and insurgents, but when our forces moved on to other targets, the killers returned. This time, we'll have the force levels we need to hold the areas that have been cleared."[69] A few months later, Bush extended the deployment periods of units already in Iraq from twelve months to fifteen months, ensuring the coalition would have the peak number of forces for operations by the summer.

For the first time since the start of the Iraq War, the Bush administration aligned its combat power in Iraq with its objectives.

General Petraeus (*right*), commander of MNF-I, meets with Iraqi General Abdullah (*left*), commander of the 4th Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division, in Baghdad in June 2007.
Defense Imagery Management Operations Center

Not only would the Defense Department increase the number of forces in Iraq, but it also would scale down its aims. Rather than attempting to transform Iraq quickly into a democracy, the coalition's strategy now entailed reducing violence across the country and protecting the Iraqi people. Doing so, the United States and its allies would grant the Iraqis breathing space within which they could lay the foundations for a civil society capable of defending itself.

The new commander of MNF-I, General Petraeus, had acquired considerable experience leading U.S. forces in Iraq as commander of the 101st Airborne Division in 2003 and as the first commanding officer of the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq in 2004, when he oversaw the creation of a new Iraqi military. In 2006, he assumed command of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and immediately initiated a series of training reforms and updates to Army doctrine to better prepare soldiers for counterinsurgency warfare. Notably, he and the U.S. Marine Corps oversaw the creation of a new manual, titled *Counterinsurgency: Field Manual 3–24*. The new manual synthesized lessons from earlier small wars, including recent operations in Iraq, and codified them into a cogent doctrine emphasizing that the key to defeating insurgencies was to protect the population and neutralize the root causes of political violence, such as economic dislocation and social upheaval.[70]

In command of MNC-I was Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, who took over from General Chiarelli in December 2006. It was up to his headquarters to devise an operation plan that would protect the population and reduce violence. The command was also responsible for deciding where and how to deploy the five new surge brigades. Relying on intelligence captured from ISI, MNC-I's planners determined that capturing Baghdad remained one of the Sunni insurgency's primary goals. To



General Odierno (*center*), commander of MNC-I, confers with Lt. Col. Richard C. Kim (*left*), commander of 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry Regiment, and Brig. Gen. Ali Ibrahim Daboun (*right*), commander of the 8th Brigade, 2d Iraqi National Police Division, in Baghdad in April 2007.
MNC-I Public Affairs

achieve this objective, they had focused on securing their position across the Baghdad belts. Sunni insurgents and Shi'a militias alike long had used these belt districts to consolidate their forces, project power and influence into the Iraqi capital, and strike at their opponents.[71]

Odierno decided to commit all five surge brigades to Baghdad and its environs—two in the capital itself (2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, and 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division), two in the southern belt (2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, and 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division), and the fifth to the northern belt district (4th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division). As the brigades gradually arrived in Iraq, MNC-I launched a two-phased campaign to secure the capital. The first began in February, when the 1st Cavalry Division launched Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (Enforcing the Law). Dividing Baghdad into security districts, the division and its Iraqi partners subsequently deployed combat forces into the city's most violent districts. After clearing neighborhoods of insurgent groups, units then built joint security stations and combat outposts to ensure they could better protect locals and prevent militants from returning. The outposts became symbols of the U.S. commitment to security and also provided locations where Baghdad's residents could submit tips on insurgent activity.[72]

The second part of Odierno's plan consisted of a series of summer offensives throughout the Baghdad belts aimed at securing the major lines of communications into the Iraqi capital. The 25th Infantry Division carried out Operation Arrowhead Ripper in the city of Baqu'bah, northeast of Baghdad. Meanwhile, the 3d Infantry Division pushed down the Tigris River and established a coalition presence across the southern belt region. Simultaneously, the II Marine Expeditionary Force reinforced its position in Al Fallujah and continued to capitalize on the gains made by the Al Anbar Awakening. The coordinated operations, with U.S. forces pushing along multiple fronts and lines of operation, placed continuous pressure upon ISI, robbing the group of its hideouts and supplies and disrupting its ability to organize and stage attacks. By the fall, these cells largely had withdrawn to new safe houses around the city of Mosul in northern Iraq.[73]

A critical factor allowing MNF-I to make these gains against the Sunni insurgency was growing infighting within the Shi'a militant movement. Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia was a formidable force, but the aggressive and lawless behavior of many of its members alienated many Iraqi Shi'a. During a religious festival on 27 August in Karbala', fighting broke out between the Mahdi Army, other militias, and Iraqi police, necessitating Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to go to the city and intervene to stop the violence. In order to reassert control over his increasingly wayward militia, Sadr declared a six-month ceasefire and ordered the Mahdi Army to suspend attacks against the Iraqi government and coalition.[74] Although the militia continued to consolidate its positions in Al Basrah and the Baghdad District of Sadr City, its suspension of strikes against the coalition allowed MNF-I to focus on defeating the Sunni insurgency. It also brought about a dramatic drop in violence across the country, with the number of daily attacks starting a sharp decline in September. When he delivered a briefing to congress on the state of the war in Iraq on 11 September 2007, General Petraeus was able to report that ISI was in retreat and violence was down to levels not seen in two years.[75]

In March 2008, Maliki launched an offensive against the city of Al Basrah to wrest control of the critical southern port from Mahdi Army control. The offensive brought an end to the truce, and sparked fighting in Baghdad between the coalition and Sadr's forces. Within just a few days, however, the Mahdi Army again sought a ceasefire. Subsequent Iraqi and coalition clearing operations led to the reassertion of Iraqi governmental control over Sadr City and Al Basrah. The offensive marked a major turning point of the war, demonstrating a new willingness on the part of the Iraqi government to neutralize the power of nongovernment militias and pursue its own interests, even if they did not align with that of the United States. This new assertiveness came to the fore when the Americans and Iraqis attempted to negotiate a new status of forces agreement that would guide U.S.-Iraqi relations after 2008. Iraqi leaders were eager to see their state regain its full sovereignty and, ultimately, the two countries agreed to a withdrawal of American troops at the end of 2011.[76]

President Bush's term ended in January 2009. His successor, Barack H. Obama, sought to reorient the United States' strategic focus to the conflict in Afghanistan. Although the new administration worked to create a revised status of forces agreement that would allow several thousand U.S. soldiers to remain and train Iraqi security forces after 2011, there was little appetite in either Iraq or the United States for a robust, continuous American troop presence in Iraq. In the absence of a revised agreement, the United States could create only an office for security cooperation at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. Beyond that, the U.S. military commitment to Iraq came to a formal end as 2011 came to a close. At the time, there was reason for cautious optimism. Iraq's armed forces were able to maintain internal security, and its government was relatively stable. However, a number of problems

An AH–64 Apache and a UH–60 Blackhawk from the Combat Aviation Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, depart Camp Dolby, six miles south of Baghdad, in 2009.
U.S. Army

were percolating under the surface. Prime Minister Maliki regularly used his office to attack political enemies, undermined the security forces to thwart potential rivals, and subverted the constitution to cling to power even though his coalition came in second place after the 2010 parliamentary elections. ISI also remained a potential threat—it had been beaten badly, but not destroyed. Nevertheless, Obama firmly believed that the United States had achieved what it could in Iraq and that it was time to bring an end to the U.S. military commitment in the country. "Iraq's future will be in the hands of its people," he declared as the last U.S. combat forces left the country at the end of 2011.[77]

It would not be long before the Americans returned to Iraq. In 2014, ISI's successor, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) launched an ambitious offensive against Iraq. Iraqi units collapsed and were pushed back east to the Euphrates and south to Baghdad, leaving most of Al Anbar, Ninewah, and Salah ad Din Provinces under the control of the ISIS's self-proclaimed caliphate. However, this conflict was decidedly different from its predecessor. The United States provided advisers, air support, and artillery, but the

S. Sgt. Michael C. Mullahy of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, attacks an insurgent position in Baghdad with an AT4 antitank missile during Operation PHANTOM THUNDER in the summer of 2007.
82d Airborne Division Public Affairs



task of fighting ISIS's forces on the ground fell to the Iraqi security forces.[78]

Analysis

The United States–led coalition committed enough troops to reach Baghdad in 2003, but not enough to hold and secure it. As a consequence of this decision, America's opponents in Iraq were able to go underground, acquire weapons, reorganize, and launch an insurgency that would take a new United States–led coalition seven years to defeat. For a variety of reasons, planners anticipated that American superiority in speed and precision would offset the need for the 500,000-strong coalition force akin to the one deployed during the 1990–1991 Gulf War. However, although these advantages allowed the U.S.-led forces to converge on Baghdad in April 2003, they proved less of an asset when the task turned to consolidating control over the objective. This task required large numbers of soldiers to establish security, restore general order, and take on the duties of administering a major metropolitan area of more than 5 million people, let alone a country of 25 million inhabitants. Even if every American soldier entering Baghdad in 2003 spoke fluent Arabic, was well-versed in the theories and tenets of counterinsurgency, and had expert knowledge about Iraqi culture and society, it still would not have made up for the fact that the coalition did not have enough troops to secure and impose its will in Iraq's capital and the rest of the country.

The Bush administration compounded this miscalculation by treating the conflict after 1 May 2003 as a postwar, stabilization operation. Once Saddam's government collapsed, U.S. civilian and military leaders struggled to define the nature of the conflict in which the United States was now engaged. The opening weeks of the war were defined by a clear-cut, conventional campaign in which the United States' armed forces utilized superior firepower and maneuverability to storm north into Baghdad and force the collapse of the Ba'athist regime. The aftermath, however, is more difficult to describe.

In fact, there were few breaks in the conflict between the opening phase from March to May 2003 and the subsequent period from May 2003 to the end of 2011. From the start, the war was a multiyear struggle to seize, control, and secure the city of Baghdad. Thus, in many important ways the war remained a conventional contest between armed forces for Iraq's capital. Although coalition forces fought insurgents across the country, Baghdad remained the war's center of gravity. Insurgent and militia lines of communications radiated in and out of the city. Urban areas critical to the insurgency, such as Al Fallujah, Ar Ramadi, and Baqu'bah, were important insofar as they supported Sunni insurgent and Shi'a militant efforts to conduct operations in Baghdad. When the coalition received reinforcements in the form of the surge brigades in 2007, MNF-I consequently deployed all of the new forces in and around Baghdad, recognizing that the key to success in Iraq was restoring security in its capital city. While company- and battalion-sized units used counterinsurgency tactics throughout the surge campaign, the Army and Marine Corps implemented these tactical approaches within a conventional operational and strategic framework. The coalition applied simultaneous pressure against insurgents and militant groups, interdicted their lines of communications, and drove those forces from Iraq's capital. Once the coalition and the Iraqi government reasserted control over Baghdad in the summer of 2008, violence across Iraq dramatically dropped.

Sgt. William B. Reese, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, watches vegetation ablaze near a canal in Diyala Province in July 2008. Soldiers set the fire to prevent insurgents from using the foliage to hide IEDs.
Joint Combat Camera Center Iraq

When it launched Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the Bush administration hoped it would be able to achieve its strategic objectives with a minimal number of troops at limited cost in terms of lives and treasure. Over the course of the subsequent eight years, more than 4,800 coalition military personnel died in the conflict. Of these, 3,000 or more came from one of the Army's three components (Active, National Guard, and Reserve). The number of Iraqis killed in the war is more difficult to pinpoint, although some sources estimate the number to be much greater than 100,000.[79] The Army learned much from the war. It rediscovered and codified the tenets of counterinsurgency. The all-volunteer force was put to the test, bore multiple strains, but ultimately persevered. As a whole, the Army demonstrated that it could adapt to a constantly changing strategic environment. Nevertheless, the main lesson from the war is one described by the nineteenth-century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, who wrote: "Everything in war is very simple—but the simplest thing is difficult."[80] On paper, Operation Iraqi Freedom looked straightforward and simple. In action, simple is not always easy, and this operation proved far more difficult than many of its initial planners had anticipated.

Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser is a historian at the Center of Military History where he specializes in the Iraq War. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Maryland, College Park. His publications include *The Surge, 2007–2008* (CMH, 2017) and *Cold War on the Airwaves: The Radio Propaganda War against East Germany* (University of Illinois Press, 2015). He is also a coauthor of *Army History and Heritage* (CMH, 2022) and the editor of *The Greene Papers: General Wallace M. Greene Jr. and the Escalation of the Vietnam War* (U. S. Marine Corps History Division, 2015).

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

NOW AVAILABLE FROM CMH

The U.S. Army Women's Museum

By Tracy H. Bradford

The U.S. Army Women's Museum (AWM) serves as an educational institution, providing training and instruction in military history to soldiers, veterans, and the civilian community. The museum is the custodian and repository of artifacts and archival material pertaining to the service of women across all branches and organizations of the U.S. Army from inception to the present day. The museum collects, preserves, manages, interprets, and exhibits these unique materials as a means to provide training and educational outreach.

The AWM, located at Fort Lee, Virginia, is the only museum in the world dedicated to preserving and sharing the history of women in the Army. The facility was established in 1955 as the Women's Army Corps Museum and resided for more than forty years at Fort McClellan, Alabama. After a move and a name change, the museum was reopened in May 2001 as the U.S. Army Women's Museum. With a renovation and expansion in 2018, the museum now honors women's contributions to the Army from 1775 to the present with state-of-the-art exhibits organized chronologically in five distinct galleries. The Origins of Service Gallery covers the first century and a half of our nation's history, when American women consistently found ways to serve with the Army. The World War II Gallery begins with the establishment of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps and explores the experiences of the 210,000 women who served at home and abroad during World War II. The Permanent Presence Gallery examines the thirty-year period that women served in the Women's Army Corps with Regular Army and Army Reserve status. Rapid change and transition for women in uniform during the 1980s and 1990s is covered in the Be All You Can Be Gallery. Finally, the 21st Century Army Gallery looks at the Army's remarkable transformation as more than two million soldiers—255,000 of them women—deployed overseas, many for multiple tours.

The AWM offers a variety of educational programs. Professional development training and tours are available for military and civilian groups. These programs engage participants and provide a memorable and impactful interaction with the story of women in the U.S. Army. Using advanced technology, the AWM also connects with classrooms around the world to bring artifacts and archives to life. Museum educators engage participants with primary sources and interactive multimedia to facilitate unique learning experiences.

For more information, please visit the museum's website at https://awm.lee.army.mil.

Tracy H. Bradford, curator at the Army Women's Museum, has worked in the Army Museum Enterprise for over ten years and was part of the team that opened the National Museum of the United States Army at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, in 2020.

Hilda Griggs, a member of the 6888th Central Postal Directory Battalion, visits the AWM in 2021.
U.S. Army

The Women's Ingenuity case in the World War II Gallery features a bathing suit made from a man's khaki uniform and a wedding dress fashioned from a parachute.
U.S. Army

In the Be All You Can Be Gallery, a soldier navigates a log obstacle designed to build confidence during basic training.
U.S. Army

The Art of Sergeant Ann B. Tilson is on exhibit in the museum's rotating gallery.
U.S. Army

Afghan women visit the AWM as part of Operation ALLIES WELCOME.
U.S. Army

A museum educator welcomes soldiers for history and heritage training.
U.S. Army

U.S. Army Art Spotlight

DoD Warrior Games Artwork

By Sarah G. Forgey

In June 2016, Army Artist-in-Residence Sfc. Juan C. Muñoz attended the Department of Defense (DoD) Warrior Games as part of his mission to document the Army's contemporary history. Hosted by the Army at West Point, New York, that year, the DoD Warrior Games are an annual event celebrating the resiliency and dedication of wounded service members. As the Army Historical Collection did not have any artwork depicting this competitive event, Sergeant Muñoz attended to watch, sketch, and photograph the athletes on site.

Begun in 2010, the DoD Warrior Games are an athletic competition for wounded, ill, and injured members of all military services and include international competitors. Athletes are coached by former Paralympians and must meet Paralympic competitive standards. To earn a place in the competition, athletes first compete in regional and service-level events, reaching the top of a field of 2,000–3,000 competitors. The games include a variety of adaptive sports, modified to allow each athlete to compete, regardless of his or her disability. Events include track and field, swimming, shooting, archery, floor volleyball, cycling, and wheelchair basketball.

Muñoz produced six watercolor paintings based on his observations of the games. The artworks are small and intimate, focused on the Army athlete with no background details. By removing the crowd from the picture, the artist invites the viewer to make a personal connection with the subject. The perspective of the artworks is that of another athlete, as if the viewer is at wheelchair level or seated on the floor. The six artworks feature a variety of sports, including several track and field events, floor volleyball, swimming, and archery. The paintings depict their subjects in deep concentration, striving to achieve their best performances.

Adaptative sports, including those in competitions like the Warrior Games, play a pivotal role in the recovery of many injured service members. Spc. Sydney Davis, who is represented in one of Muñoz's artworks during archery competition, said of adaptive sports, "[They] gave me a reason to fight. It gave me a reason to come back and say that I have something to show. I have something to live for—[to] show that I'm not broken."[1] For many of the athletes, adaptive sports offer not only a return to athletic pursuits that may be physically challenging or impossible due to their injuries, but also a return to the camaraderie with their fellow service members that had been missing within the isolation of recovery. While most of Muñoz's six artworks portray athletes engaged in individual competition, the team atmosphere is also an important focus of the Warrior Games. A "Heart of the Team" award is given to the member of each team that best demonstrates the camaraderie of the sport.

Sergeant Muñoz's six watercolors depicting the 2016 DoD Warrior Games are preserved at the U.S. Army's Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and are available to support exhibits in both Army and civilian museums.

All art shown is by Sfc. Juan C. Muñoz, watercolor and ink on paper, 2017.

NOTE

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Sarah G. Forgey is the chief art curator for the Army Museum Enterprise.



SGT Evans

J.C. MUÑOZ 2017

SGT Lercy

J.C. MUÑOZ

SSG Lahers

SGT Mason and SPC Barr

SFC Armstrong




SPC Davis
A. MUÑOZ
2017

BRING THEM UP TO STANDARD

Historical Perspective on How the Army Has Worked with Unqualified Recruits



A soldier ponders a test question, ca. 1918.
National Archives

By Sanders Marble

The Army is facing both transient and structural recruiting problems. In 2022, unemployment was low, and in future decades there will be a smaller cohort of youth eligible to serve at current standards. In recent years, the Army has struggled to recruit the roughly 70,000 personnel needed annually for the active and reserve components from the roughly 25 percent of the American population who meet the physical, educational, and moral standards of Army service.

There have been shortages of desired personnel in the past, in both wartime and peacetime. Wartime "fixes" got the service through World War I and World War II without notable controversy. The Cold War and the peacetime draft changed the problem of access to personnel into problems of access to skilled and motivated personnel; the draft could produce large numbers but not necessarily bring in skilled and motivated personnel. In the mid-1960s, the Army considered and implemented a program to upgrade individuals, which proved politically troublesome. In 1973, the All-Volunteer Force changed recruiting again. Although the problem has changed, historical perspective may prove useful for current and upcoming problems.

The World Wars: Responding to Personnel Crises

In both World Wars the Army had implemented programs to bring soldiers up to necessary qualifications, both physically and educationally. These were conceived as short-term programs, only needed for wartime.

Before World War I, the U.S. Army had a one-size-fits-all mentality, with only one physical standard for enlistment regardless of the recruit's future assignment, be it charging with rifle and bayonet, driving wagons, or sitting behind a desk. However, those enlistment standards changed over time.[1] Starting from very basic standards in the early days (having all four limbs and enough teeth to chew hardtack), the Army gradually added more standards, such as not being obviously insane or addicted to drugs. In the 1890s, major changes were implemented. Volunteers had to be citizens or immigrants on the path to citizenship, and they had to be literate in English. Physical standards were raised. As a result, only 44 percent of applicants were accepted.[2]

At the beginning of 1917, the Army had only around 200,000 men. A draft was implemented for males between the ages of 21 and 30, with exemptions for the physically, mentally, and morally unfit.[3] Even before the draft became operational, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker Jr. lowered existing standards: National Guardsmen no longer had to be able to read and write English, although they did have to speak it.[4] As the draft was starting, the first *Regulations Governing Physical Examinations* allowed examiners to waive normal height and weight standards if the candidate was "active, [had] firm muscles, and [was] evidently vigorous and healthy."[5]

Secretary Baker (*blindfolded*) draws for the draft, ca. 1918.
Library of Congress

By late August, standards had been lowered repeatedly.[6]

The first draft call was for roughly one million men, but in early 1918, General John J. Pershing more than tripled the projected size of the American Expeditionary Forces.[7] The War Department was left to find the required personnel, and Congress revised the draft ages to 18 to 45.[8] There were other pressures as well. Politicians wanted to draft as few men as possible; that not only would disrupt fewer families but also would reduce disruption of the economy—and thus war production—by pulling fewer men from their jobs. Yet, to yield a larger army while drafting fewer men, there would have to be a higher acceptance rate. This led to two programs. The first was a program of remedial units, which were meant to improve the physically marginal. These units also would be tasked with teaching recruits enough English for them to become acceptable. A second, larger program would match physically limited troops to the jobs they could perform adequately.

In late 1917, as data from the first draft became available, the public was shocked at how few men were fully fit. Almost half the draftees had defects, often more than one—and these were men who were presumably in the prime of life. Not all defects warranted rejection, however; only 29 percent of those examined were turned down, and 40 percent of accepted men had a defect), but the public was amazed.[9]

Many of the defects were attributable to poverty and its attendant lack of healthcare: tenement dwellers and sharecroppers were often in poor health or had a chronic injury. Another problem was the need to reject immigrants who did not understand English; they were of no use to the Army if they could not follow an order. Illiterate citizens, especially common in the South and Southwest, were also a problem.

It was the era of social Darwinism, better baby contests, and eugenics, which yielded many ideas about how to improve or at least preserve the population. In November 1917, a Cleveland doctor and exercise enthusiast, John Quayle, proposed "reclamation camps for the physically unfit," where exercise, better diet, and minor surgery would make up to 90 percent of Army rejects fit for duty.[10] He also thought that discipline and what he called "mass psychology" would inculcate patriotism and somehow

Recruits taking part in psychological testing at Fort Lee, Virginia, in November 1917
National Archives

overcome neuroses and even psychoses in camp attendees. Quayle got the ear of Senator Atlee Pomerene, who trumpeted (but apparently never introduced) a Man-Reclamation Act that presumably would have put those ideas into law, and the idea received attention in some mass-market magazines and journals.[11] Quayle reflected the Progressive Era mindset that much about humankind is perfectible (while recognizing some problems could not be remediated), and he probably tapped into concerns about assimilating minority groups into a single American identity. In that regard, the camps could also be using the military as a way to "Americanize" the working class.[12] In many ways, Quayle was right: hernias, hemorrhoids, and varicose veins could be repaired; rotting teeth could be patched or replaced; and exercise could bulk up weedy specimens and slim the overweight. By April 1918, there was still enthusiasm for the concept, although it was tempered by the recognition that, first, many individuals would not welcome Army doctors performing surgery on them in order to put them in the trenches and, second, certain religious groups (especially Christian Scientists) would object.

Although Pomerene's bill faded, in mid-December 1917, the Army pragmatically amended the draft from an either/or, accept/reject standard to:

Class A: unconditionally accepted for general military service
Class B: individuals who possessed certain physical defects, diseases, or abnormalities which rendered them unfit for service, but which conditions were capable of cure by treatment, surgical or otherwise
Class C: fit for special or limited military service
Class D: unconditionally rejected for all military service[13]

It took the Army until March 1918 to produce specific guidelines.[14] Acceptable Class B defects included: bone and joint deformities, hernias, benign tumors, large hemorrhoids, varicoceles, hydroceles, jaundice, pellagra, abdominal or anal fistula, and venereal diseases. Some arrangements were made for patients to be treated (gratis) before military induction, but few volunteered. Another suggestion was to tell those who failed their induction physical why they failed and how they could remedy the "defects."[15] It is unclear whether this was to encourage them to make themselves fit for the draft, or if it was just life advice.

Desperate for additional personnel, the Army contemplated inducting Class B recruits into the Army and then treating them in Army hospitals. Although much of the needed surgery would be straightforward, Army hospitals already were full from the epidemics of childhood diseases among the divisions forming during the winter of 1917–1918. Remediation patients were stuck behind the actively sick patients. At one point, around 10,000 men were in need of hernia operations.[16]

Most Class B draftees went into the development battalions, which became a dumping ground for "all unfit men," including enemy aliens, conscientious objectors, and the morally degenerate.[17] Thus, other units used the development battalions as more of an administrative convenience than as a means to actually develop troops for service. Development battalions had begun locally as early as December 1917, with a focus on orthopedic problems (especially flat feet). Then, in May 1918, the War Department ordered a development battalion for every divisional camp. Men assigned to these battalions were to receive appropriate medical care and training for up to two months and then be reassessed. (Four months were allowed for those in need of English-language training.) If they could serve productively after that period, they would; if not, they were discharged. Ultimately, more than 209,000 troops went

Senator Pomerene
Library of Congress

Soldiers at Camp Meade, Maryland, fill out a medical questionnaire, ca. 1918.
National Archives

through development battalions, with 19.8 percent going on to full duty, 42 percent to limited duty, 17.4 percent discharged, and 19.4 percent still in the battalions when the fighting ended.[18]

Enlisting illiterate personnel depended on the suspension of standards; in wartime, Congress waived the requirement. As a result, roughly one-quarter of recruits were illiterate, at least in English. Despite the development battalions, many troops who could not read or write in English served overseas, doubtless including some who could not understand many spoken commands either. After the war, the Army briefly continued literacy training, partly to expand the recruiting pool to illiterate people.[19] A Recruit Education Center was established at Camp Emory Upton in New York on 1 May 1919. It provided a four-month course in English, and roughly 1,500 soldiers graduated over the first year of operations. Five more centers were established in 1920, but budget cuts ended the program in 1921.

After much political heat, though little light, about universal military training and peacetime conscription, the 1920 National Defense Act eschewed the notion of required military service and reverted to traditional voluntarism. With no need for a large military, there was presumably no need to enlist troops who were in need of remediation. The Army was very small in the 1920s and the 1930s, especially during the Great Depression, and was able to attract enough recruits of adequate quality. Enlistment standards returned to pre–World War I levels.[20]

The Army did, however, plan for wartime expansion, writing regulations for a mass mobilization. These included development battalions, which were later retitled special training battalions.[21] In addition, the Army planned to use recruits who would fall below normal enlistment standards (classified as "limited service") and to keep troops who, through wounds, injury, or disease, no longer would meet normal physical standards.[22] These two groups would not be brought up to the standard, but their skills and experience would be useful behind the lines. They still could be enlisted or retained and used, especially if they were overseas, which would reduce draft calls, economize on shipping space, and decrease the time needed to fill noncombat positions.

The mobilization before the United States joined World War II did include an actual remedial enlistment program. The draft started in September 1940, and the first call had a 32 percent rejection rate for physical reasons alone—a rate which proved the Army's prediction of a 20 percent rejection rate for all reasons had been vastly below reality.[23] As a result, a far more modest program was proposed. In April 1941, Selective Service headquarters announced a "prehabilitation" program, where recruits would: (1) learn the Army's physical standards; (2) consult their own doctor or dentist, who either would perform the necessary procedure(s) or refer them to an organization serving the poor; and (3) report to Selective Service to see if they were then fit for military service.[24] Of course, a certain number of the men who could be physically "prehabilitated" would not pass the other tests. When the Army would not fund the program, Selective Service made it a voluntary program and urged participation, reminding recruits

Soldiers taking a timed mental acuity test, ca. 1918
National Archives

that the alternative was compulsory rehabilitation after induction.[25]

Results were, predictably, negligible. This did not stop Brig. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, the acting director of the Selective Service, from continuing to advocate prehabilitation. (General Hershey would be confirmed as the Selective Service director on 31 July 1941, and he would serve in this capacity until 1970.) As director of Selective Service, Hershey would frame the discussion as deepening the personnel pool and making military service more equitable. Ultimately, Hershey would call for inducting all illiterate draftees and half of those with physical problems.[26]

Simultaneously, the Army was studying rehabilitation. Lacking medical resources, the service was unwilling to induct remediable individuals and treat them, especially when fully fit men were probably available in the draft pool. In July 1941, the Army suggested a voluntary prehabilitation program with the government paying for the care.[27] Intragovernment discussions continued through the autumn of 1941, and General Hershey persuaded President Franklin D. Roosevelt to broker a conference at Hyde Park.[28] Once Roosevelt made it clear funds were available, a consensus emerged: Selective Service would run "a program for rehabilitation of rejected men between the ages of 21 and 28 found by the Army to have remediable defects" and up to 200,000 such men would be accepted.[29] Nonsurgical patients were prioritized, and dental patients would be the test cases for federal funding.[30] Army dentists would examine Selective Service registrants and indicate the necessary work, then a civilian dentist would treat the patients.

Hershey's timing, however, was terrible: he gained funding only in October 1941, and although a test limited to only Virginia and Maryland began around February 1942, the program disappeared. There were many problems. Doctors and dentists were joining the military, which reduced civilian-sector capacity for rehabilitation work while increasing the military's capability. The induction standards were dropping, and many of the men were now considered fit for service without remediation. The program threatened to be extremely expensive: fixing one dental defect per patient cost an average of $87, the equivalent of more than $1,650 in 2022 dollars. Finally, most patients needed surgical work rather than nonsurgical work.[31] In addition, Hershey apparently continued a remnant of his education campaign, hoping that amid the patriotic outpouring of World War II, potential volunteers would, when told what made them unacceptable for military service, pay for their own rehabilitation.[32] Similarly, Hershey had the wartime Office of Vocational Rehabilitation steer men to medical care.[33]

In early and mid-1942, as part of lowering the physical standards, the Army considered what conditions would not be disqualifying. Most, by number, were surgically correctible, but some were medically correctible. These included venereal diseases, nutritional diseases, and malaria, which was still endemic in the southern United States.[34] Lowering the dental and vision requirements made the most difference. More than one million individuals became acceptable from lowered dental requirements, and 250,000 became acceptable when the Army chose to provide eyeglasses. The dental program came with a substantial cost: in 1942–1943 alone, dental patients required 31 million fillings, 6 million replacement teeth, and 1.5 million bridges and dentures, totaling 53 million sittings. Then there was the corresponding construction and staffing of dental clinics as the Army learned that each recruit needed an average of 7.2 hours of dental care.[35] The 138,723 male recruits with preexisting venereal diseases were also costly: thirty-four hospitals (with 6,510 beds) were built and staffed.[36] Surgically, hernias may have been the most common of the remediable defects that were accepted; more than 7,000 serious hernias were operated on successfully. Even small Army hospitals performed up to ten herniotomies per day.[37]

The military had to provide physical fitness training to recruits who were "pampered, soft, flabby, and in need of conditioning."[38] Many enlistees needed several weeks of physical training after induction. Looking at another personnel source because "limited service" men also had been inducted, the Army considered remediating in uniform those who with "appropriate physical training and remedial medical measures" could be brought up to the "general service" standard.[39] However, most commanders, thinking they could get "general service" personnel more easily from the draft, instead simply discharged the "limited service" troops.

As physical standards dropped during World War II, so too did educational and mental standards. The World War I experience was relevant. Many men who were not literate in English could be intelligent but lacking knowledge; perhaps they had left

Soldiers at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, scale an eight-foot wall, ca. 1942. The ropes were intended for use by shorter soldiers who otherwise could not reach the top.
Library of Congress

school young for work or had had substandard schooling. In late May 1942, the Army allowed but did not require a version of the World War I development battalions and Recruit Education Centers, now termed Special Training Units (STUs), but with no particular training program.[40] Previously, the Army educational standard had been at the fourth-grade level. (Candidates did not need to finish fourth grade; they just had to be able to read and understand at that level.) Candidates lacking that standard were deferred. By August 1942, around 200,000 physically fit potential recruits had been deferred for lack of education.[41] That pool needed to be tapped, and from 1 August 1942 each induction station could accept up to 10 percent of its daily total of illiterate candidates, provided there was reason to think they would absorb military training quickly. However, the STUs provided no systematic training for these men, nor were there positions for them. In consequence, they became a burden to their units. Ad hoc training units were the temporary fix, and in February 1943, the maximum number of illiterate personnel was cut to 5 percent per day. Educational programs, whether sponsored by Selective Service or local governments, had only spotty success. So, in June 1943, the War Department ordered STUs widely established and lifted all restrictions on numbers of illiterate inductees.[42] STUs received roughly 11.5 percent of inductees, including more than one-sixth of all inductees in 1945. Eighty percent were either non-English speaking or illiterate, and the balance had scored in the lowest category on the Army General Classification Test, which was intended not as an intelligence test but as an indicator of how well a person could absorb training. At STUs, recruits had three hours of classroom teaching and five hours of military training per day, for up to ninety days. In practice, 85 percent completed the training and went to units. Forty-four percent needed thirty days or less, and 79 percent completed their remedial training in sixty days or less. The rest were discharged.[43] The system was not perfect, however. For a while, some STUs had men take the Army General Classification Test repeatedly until they managed a passing score, then declared them literate and shipped them out. Also, the education gains were not necessarily lasting; soldiers who did not continue to read or write in their units often regressed.

Over twenty-six months, the STUs received 260,000 trainees and sent 220,000 on to Army units. With a maximum of 5,300 training and education staff, this proved to be a highly efficient program for the Army.[44] However, the 220,000 graduates were only around 7.6 percent of total enlisted inductions to the Army over the period the STUs operated, and the United States might have been able to find the same number of people who met accession standards without the STU program—albeit by conscripting and then discharging more men, resulting in greater disruption to the war economy.

Personnel and National Security: The Debate Changes

Episodic wars could have fluctuating personnel standards without challenging conceptions of national strength. The gradual recognition that the Cold War would shift the paradigm from war or peace to a spectrum of national security concerns, however, had repercussions on military personnel thinking. The nation needed long-term strength, implying a concomitant investment in people. To some policymakers, that meant bringing people up to the military standard, although there was mixed success in gaining broad acceptance of the necessary programs.

The Army had suggested universal military training (UMT) in the past, but it gained substantially more attention late in World War II, as induction standards dipped, and

A squad does log exercises during physical training at Fort Benning, Georgia, on 6 October 1944.
National Archives

for the next few years. In April 1944, Selective Service Director Hershey argued:

> We must make plans to provide a system that will bring to the youth of America the opportunity to guard their health, to develop their bodies so that they will be prepared to accept all of the responsibilities of citizenship, and to train them in the proper type of relaxation and recreation to the end that they may adjust themselves to the stresses of our age and escape the fate of those who have been found to be unfit because of mental diseases.[45]

Although much of what Hershey and other UMT advocates envisioned was military service raising the health standards across the nation (through immunizations and health education), they also clearly envisioned bringing in substandard young men and improving them.[46] In 1945, presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman both advocated UMT. Truman specifically referred to "removing some of the minor disabilities which caused the rejection of so many men during this war."[47] Truman started a President's Advisory Commission to generate support for UMT, something that would take months to come to fruition. The report unsurprisingly advocated UMT but tried to generate support by stressing nonmilitary elements such as medical diagnoses, vocational guidance, and literacy training.[48] Even though there was opposition to a perceived militarization of Americans, the War Department was able to start a test unit. Training started at Fort Knox, Kentucky, on 5 January 1947 with 657 trainees.[49]

In May 1947, while the experimental unit was progressing, Truman's Advisory Commission reported.[50] They recognized that UMT could not fix eighteen years of people's pasts, and health benefits would not justify the program. However, the physical exams would identify many health problems, and the trainees could be referred to local medical authorities. The committee further thought the Army should do what it could, such as dental work and fixing hernias, and in addition help under- and overweight recruits meet the weight standard. Health benefits not provided by the Army could be provided other ways (e.g., through universal health insurance, also under consideration at the time) if money was available. The commission acknowledged questions about whether remediation should be required.

The UMT trainees at Fort Knox apparently had nothing more serious than dental (and perhaps vision) problems, probably because they were already military volunteers who had further volunteered for the UMT test unit. Dental problems were widespread, at almost 90 percent. The great majority of trainees gained a bit of weight as muscle, while a few (mostly overweight to begin with) lost weight.[51] It seems none of the problems would have been complicated or costly to remedy, although the shortage of dentists in the Army meant that many fillings could not be completed; still, more complicated dental work was done. Army doctors seem to have been mildly in favor of UMT, pointing out the national health benefits.[52]

UMT languished, however, because of significant political opposition. There was a slight revival of support early in the Korean War, but Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar N. Bradley made it clear that any benefits beyond getting soldiers readier to fight "are byproducts."[53] The Army did not need to remediate recruits for its small active duty force, and it had little stomach for a program causing as much upheaval as UMT with a result as tangential as remediation. Truman also had lost a political battle for government-run national health insurance, which likely made it harder to obtain health benefits through UMT as a backdoor.

When UMT failed (beyond conscription legislation being titled the Universal Military Training and Service Act), the idea of government remediation submerged. "Make yourself fit" discussions still bubbled up on occasion, as in, for example, *Are You Ready for Service?*, from the Coronet Films series for young adults.[54] Young men were encouraged to exercise and were advised to "Find Information—Check Yourself—Develop Yourself—START NOW," by obtaining medical and dental care at their own expense. *Are You Ready for Service?* had input from a variety of education organizations and the Department of Defense. Nevertheless, with a relatively small military, the Army could keep physical standards high and thus had no need for remediation.

In the early 1950s, Dwight D. Eisenhower became involved. He had a broad interest in military personnel, including allowing certain amputees to rejoin the military. While he was president of Columbia University, he shifted the university's existing Conservation of Human Resources project from the subjects of economics and sociology to an examination of military and national manpower policy. Later, from his Brussels desk at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, he convinced the Ford Foundation to fund the National Manpower Council, which was also at Columbia and which shared some staff with the Conservation of Human Resources project. The council's goal was to provide "a continuing appraisal of America's manpower resources in a period of enduring emergency."[55] Neither of these groups made a dramatic call to the public for action, but each provided analysis of problems and advice for policymaking elites.[56] The social scientists looked at efficient uses of human resources, including the use of women, educated workers, skilled workers, scientists, the elderly, and racial minorities.[57] They recognized ways in which the government could encourage, both directly and indirectly, the use of various human resources, such as by setting deferment policy and encouraging Department of Labor training programs and apprenticeships.[58] Their bottom line was that unhealthy, uneducated citizens were of no use to the military and of little use to the nation. While covering more people and for more purposes under the aegis of national security, this had echoes of John Quayle's camps to improve men for military service.

Eisenhower's interest cropped up in various other ways. From 1949 to 1957, the military studied different ways to train and use personnel with low and no literacy, and a Marginal Manpower Working Group met in 1953 and 1954, although its agenda is unclear.[59] Eisenhower was working to develop a place for personnel in national security and making it clear that national security was larger than just the military. In 1954, Eisenhower's secretary of labor, James P. Mitchell, noted the military utility of a better-skilled populace: "The United States' margin of advantage in the Cold War is slipping. To prevent this, we must develop and use our skills."[60] Mitchell established the Office of Manpower Administration to help meet mobilization and civil defense needs. The National Defense Education Act of 1958 was another high-profile example of how national defense was used as a strong justification for improving the overall quality of American manpower, because "the defense of this Nation depends upon the mastery of modern techniques developed from complex scientific principles."[61] Similarly, national defense was thought to

be a strong enough justification for federal action that the Federal-Aid Highways Act was rebranded as the National Interstate and Defense Highways Act.

In the mid-1950s, there was continuing interest in the fitness of American youth, but little action in the military. In 1955, Eisenhower established the President's Council on Youth Fitness.[62] A decade earlier, President Roosevelt had declared a "Physical Fitness Year" from 1 September 1944 to 1 September 1945, and he had established a National Committee on Physical Fitness. Now, President Eisenhower refocused the committee on the young and made it permanent. Meanwhile, as the President's Council on Youth Fitness, it would, presumably, have an indirect impact on fitness for military service, as the Boy Scouts had done when it was established. To indicate the council's indirect role in national defense, the secretary of defense was one of the members. The following year, Hershey began urging the creation of 1–Y, a new category for draft-deferred young men who were considered unacceptable in peacetime but acceptable in times of emergency.[63] The 1–Y category both recognized the high standard for peacetime (a time when the military was deliberately small, and draft calls were very low) and avoided the disruption, in times of emergency, of having to reexamine people who had been classified as 4–F (unfit for military service) to reclassify them as 1–A (fit for service).

The interest in draftee's health led to use of the Selective Service medical screening to advise medically rejected young men.[64] Selective Services would bring local health providers to examining stations, where they could tell rejected or deferred individuals what they needed to remedy. This was, unfortunately for the military, ineffective; less than 5 percent of draftees moved to a higher draft category. Even though making oneself healthier was desirable, few young men sought to be subject to the draft. The health advisers began to rephrase their pitch, saying the government cared about the candidates' job prospects. Selective Services also brought in social service and educational agencies to advise the potential draftees on job training programs.[65]

By mid-1961, the rejection rate for draftees had climbed to more than 50 percent. By comparison, from 1946 to 1956, the average was 48 percent; in December 1958 it was 49.1 percent; in 1961 it hit 52.7 percent. President John F. Kennedy, who deliberately projected a youthful and athletic persona, was stunned. He asked Hershey how many of the rejections were for physical reasons and learned that, over the long term, five out of six were, that the percentage was rising, and that one-quarter could have been salvaged by fitness campaigns and early medical advice or intervention.[66] President Kennedy promptly renewed the call for a national fitness campaign. The Pentagon directed the services to establish physical fitness programs, and Kennedy issued a press release the week schools reopened calling for more fitness programs. Government officials—from individual schoolteachers all the way up to Kennedy himself—promoted the belief that individual physical fitness contributed to national fitness and readiness.

As a follow-up, in January 1962, Kennedy approved the 1–Y classification. In six months, Selective Service had classified one million young men as 1–Y, and by mid-1964, 1.55 million had been classified as 1–Y.[67] At that time, Hershey also reported his broadening of the 1962 health referral program to include referrals to job training—calling it manpower conservation and poverty mitigation—an action which, on its own, probably would have attracted little opposition. But he went substantially further, recommending the creation of a Special Training Corps under joint military and civilian tutelage "for an intensive program in the basics of reading and ciphering, with supplemental programs in citizenship, guidance, counseling, pretechnical training, and physical fitness."[68]

The development of human resources was a growing concern in general, not just in the military. In February 1962, Congress passed the Manpower Development and Training Act, not citing national security reasons but indicating how training, skills, education, and development were becoming a higher priority in general.[69] In the fall of 1963, Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz Jr. concluded that the overwhelming majority of Armed Forces Qualifying Test–rejectees were poorly educated rather than stupid.[70] Wirtz and others suggested using military resources such as training camps, personnel, and expertise to train (apparently for nonmilitary purposes) those who had been rejected for mental reasons. Kennedy liked the idea, and on 30 September 1963, he established the Task Force on Manpower Conservation, consisting mainly of cabinet secretaries. Its report found unsurprising correlations between lack of schooling, unemployment, and draft rejection, and called for rehabilitation of those rejected. Specifically, it suggested that men be examined at 18 so they could be given advice and help; this would benefit the military, the economy, and the nation. That was quickly adopted.[71] A progress report mentioned that the task force had considered inducting "rejectees (medical and mental) near the top of the range into the armed forces," and the "use of military facilities in remedial programs."[72] The thinking on national security, which had moved from increasing knowledge to firming muscles and now was into remediating rejectees, was on the verge of crossing into using the military to upgrade the nation's manpower.

However, the politics would change. In January 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson launched the War on Poverty with R. Sergeant Shriver as its director. The next month, Shriver already was musing about having the Department of Defense run camps, perhaps like the Civilian Conservation Corps of the 1930s. The Department of Defense was the least political agency possible—an important consideration in an election year—and Johnson advised persuading Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to support the idea of the camps. McNamara's reputation for rigorous efficiency, along with his being a Republican, would help the program immensely.[73] At the same time, Hershey called for 1–Ys to be

Secretary Wirtz
National Archives

inducted for two years of literacy training, corrective medical care, and citizenship and teamwork training.[74] A study published in early 1964 showed that many draft rejectees wanted to serve in the military, whether from patriotism or to obtain useful training.[75] Shriver liked the idea of using the Selective Service System screening as a referral tool and talked about lowering the draft registration age (and thus the screening age) to 16 or 17, which proved politically unpalatable.[76]

Interestingly, against this backdrop of remediation for military service, a small program to improve physically marginal personnel already in the military was dropped. From 1951 to 1963, the 101st Airborne Division—a basic training division for much of the period—had a Company Q to help trainees with the lowest acceptable physical rating. Most of the trainees had chronic leg or back problems, and in Company Q they were given the physical training they could handle. After eight weeks, they were reassessed; some were so much improved they could go to combat infantry assignments, whereas others were assigned wherever they could serve.[77] For whatever reason, Company Q was abolished on 1 December 1963.

There was no unanimity on the desirability of remediation. In late 1961 and early 1962, General James A. Van Fleet, retired but acting as a consultant to Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, visited a number of military installations, and his queries to senior officers included the topic of "undesirable trainees." He returned with reports of commanders' frustration with "individuals who are physically, morally, and mentally unqualified to be soldiers." He summarized that "the Army should not be expected to be the primary agency for the salvation of the Nation's misfits and undesirables. Too much time and effort are spent on these individuals at the expense of other individuals willing and able to become good soldiers."[78] Van Fleet wanted all substandard recruits to be purged before training started, although he had no suggestion for how that was to happen.

With these factors in the background, Hershey changed the draft procedures to examine 18-year-olds early so that they would have more time to act on the information about their health and educational and training opportunities. (Previously, the draft had taken only the eldest in the draftable age range of 18 to 26, so only the older candidates had been examined.) Hershey cast this in terms of improving the personnel pool for national defense. He also again contemplated inducting all 1–Y men and remediating them at government expense; this would improve the pool and potentially help the economy, but at substantial expense.[79] Just examining the 18-year-olds cost an extra $1.5 million.[80]

President Johnson—who was establishing Great Society programs to help eradicate poverty and racial injustice—saw that the military could benefit society just as new programs such as the Job Corps could prepare individuals for military service. The political winds were with Hershey: the Job Corps indeed was seen as benefiting the military, with one-quarter of participants joining the services, and McNamara testified for it.[81] In mid-1964, the Department of Defense was studying internally what McNamara termed a "youth rehabilitation program," and the United States could have been close to using the military as a "school for the nation."[82] Although McNamara sat on final proposals for two months (to avoid any controversy troubling other War on Poverty legislation and, presumably, to avoid extra controversy in the presidential election), news leaked.[83] In August, McNamara announced the Special Training and Enlistment Program

Secretary McNamara
Library of Congress

Congressman Alexander Pirnie (*center*) reaches into a container of draft numbers as others, including retiring Selective Service Director General Hershey (*left*) and Deputy Director Col. Daniel O. Omer (*right*), look on.
Library of Congress

(STEP). The program can be summarized as follows:

> Under STEP, the Army would provide six months of special instruction and "remedial therapy" to correct educational and physical shortcomings among a target group of volunteers. They would receive four hours of general educational instruction per day during fourteen weeks of basic combat training and eight weeks of advanced individual training. During this period, the Army would evaluate which trainees might prove effective soldiers to serve out the balance of a three-year enlistment while the others would be discharged without bias. McNamara wanted a minimum of 60,000 STEP enlistees trained at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, between April 1965 and March 1969 at an estimated cost of approximately $135 million.[84]

McNamara framed his program as reducing draft calls by expanding the number of volunteers that were acceptable, which had been part of President Johnson's preelection tap dance with ending the draft.[85] STEP would reduce draft numbers both by allowing more volunteers and because the volunteers would serve for three years versus the two years draftees would serve. Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes declared that STEP would not lower the standards but would bring volunteers up to current standards. He asserted that STEP was not a social program but a defense program with social benefits. Although the bulk of STEP troops would be educational cases, some enrollees who had failed the draft physical now would be acceptable. The early parameters included those whose medical problems were either weight-related or permanently remediable within six weeks, with an estimated cost per participant of $2,100 (nearly $20,000 in 2022 dollars).[86] STEP had some support but ran into enough uncoordinated opposition that it stalled. The military disdained it, calling it a "moron corps" based at "moron camps," while some segregationist politicians opposed it because the educational component would disproportionately benefit Black people.[87] For an explicitly antipoverty program, Congress preferred the Job Corps. Poverty might affect the military, but the military was not to be part of the War on Poverty. Soon, the basic training camps were filled with other young men as the military was expanded to fight the Vietnam War.[88]

These factors were in McNamara's mind as he pondered the next move. Angered that Congress had blocked STEP, he doubled down on other initiatives such as Project 100,000. The goal of this program was to recruit up to 100,000 young men (termed New Standards Men) per year who did not meet the enlistment standards but were judged trainable. The project came from STEP, but McNamara also drew on his interest in national service, which would both use the military as a "school for the nation" and habilitate young men.[89] McNamara was far ahead of military opinion, but he was in line with those pondering national manpower. Even with Project 100,000 in place, the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service felt the loss of half the potential personnel pool was "affecting directly [their] national security" and declared that "any American who desires to serve in the Armed Forces should be able to serve if he can be brought up to a level of usefulness as a soldier, even if this requires special educational and training programs to be conducted by the services."[90] For them, 100,000 was not enough.

McNamara and the Johnson administration defended Project 100,000 on the grounds of both military and societal utility. The first major public report on Project 100,000 gave various defenses for accepting

Secretary Ailes
National Archives

Soldiers take part in grenade training at Fort Ord, California, ca. 1965.
California State University, Monterey Bay

both mental and physical categories of New Standards Men, including the argument that, "as a by-product, their service would prepare them for more productive lives when they returned to civilian life."[91] Another explanation positioned the program as benefiting both military and national security:

> DOD [Department of Defense], along with all other major institutions, should be concerned with the broader aspects of national security. Our well-being as a nation suffers when we lose the potential contribution of a sizable proportion of our young men because of low academic achievement, undeveloped talent, and despair. Project One Hundred Thousand recognized the opportunity of the armed forces to contribute their unique capabilities toward improving the competence of a portion of our nation's youth.[92]

The program would continue to be controversial both during the Vietnam War and after it.

There was an uncontroversial part. Those who had failed physical standards were originally part of Project 100,000, but they soon were separated into the Medically Remedial Enlistment Program (MREP), perhaps to sidestep the rancor around Project 100,000. MREP allowed the enlistment (or reenlistment, if a candidate had been discharged for an undetected problem) of over- and underweight candidates as well as those with problems that could be corrected with minor surgery. A key point was that all remediation would be complete within approximately six weeks, reflecting the selection of low-risk conditions that could be cured easily. This was apparently accomplished without extra personnel. The MREP was only 5 percent of New Standards Men, about 6,500 in the first twenty months, expanding by another 14,000 in the following eighteen months. Of the 70,000 eligible personnel, 24,000 applied for the MREP, and 20,708 were enlisted. Overwhelmingly, the young men were pudgy (62.8 percent) or skinny (20.7 percent), and hernias (1,380 or 6.7 percent) were the most numerous surgical category.[93] MREP participants met the normal mental standards and had sufficient drive to undergo remediation to be able to serve, so it is easy to understand why the services readily accepted them, in comparison with the "moron corps." Interestingly, the distribution between services of MREP participants was substantially different from other Project 100,000 participants (*Table 1*).

The MREP continued at some level through at least 30 November 1973.[94] Since then, the Army has made fewer changes to accession standards but instead has used individual waivers. That structural change means there have been few other programs to accept recruits who did not meet the standard. One notable effort is the Assessment of Recruit Motivation and Strength program, which accepted recruits who were overweight and had too high a body fat percentage but passed certain physical tests.[95] This program began in 2005, when recruiting was inadequate for an expanding Army, at the same time that the Army was looking at ways to decrease attrition in Basic Combat Training because of physical problems.[96]

Conclusion

In two great wars, the U.S. Army saw no problems in habilitating people for service. When the Cold War switched the dichotomy of war or peace to national security and prolonged mobilization, the long-standing conflation of fitness and education of young recruits with national strength gained relevance. It was a form of mobilization in depth that stood alongside other investments in people, like education, and things, such as infrastructure, for national defense. However logical the steps were to elites, the think tanks at Columbia made little impact on the wider public, and their proposals became stuck in the craws of some politicians and senior officers. The notion of the Great Society was not universally popular, and the conflation of military and civilian programs gave the public a wider opening to criticize its various programs. No matter how well they fit with military precedent, programs that highlighted nonmilitary outcomes were more controversial.

Afterword

This past summer, the Army started the Future Soldier Preparatory Course to raise recruits to the standard to enter Basic Combat Training. Still a trial effort, this course includes both a physical component to reduce body fat and an academic component to raise Armed Forces Qualifying Test scores.

Table 1— Medically Remedial Enlistment Program (MREP) Participants by Service, October 1966–December 1969

Service	New Mental Standards (October 1966–July 1968)		MREP (October 1966–July 1968)		MREP (August 1968–December 1969)	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Army	86,025	72.5	1,732	26.6	6,271	30.3
Navy	11,658	9.8	2,312	35.5	7,441	35.9
Marine Corps	11,038	9.3	689	10.5	2,202	10.6
Air Force	9,910	8.4	1,788	27.4	4,794	23.2
Total	118,631	100	6,521	100	20,708	100

Source: Health of the Army Rpt, Office of the Surgeon General, Medical Statistics Agency, Department of the Army, Oct 1971, 104, Stimson Library, U.S. Army Medical Center of Excellence, Joint Base San Antonio-Fort Sam Houston, TX.

Drill sergeants welcome their first company of soldiers to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, in 2017.
Department of Defense

The academic element is based on the Basic Skills Education Program, which is available to current enlisted soldiers who wish to boost their Armed Forces Qualifying Test scores so they can qualify for other opportunities in the Army. Both components run in three-week cycles, and if potential recruits pass, they move on to Basic Combat Training. Otherwise, they recycle for up to ninety days. Although new in its current guise, the Future Soldier Preparatory Course builds on more than a century of intermittent efforts to improve the bodies and knowledge of Army recruits to bring them up to standard. If the past is any guide, it will make a modest difference.

Dr. Sanders Marble received his PhD in military history from King's College, University of London, in 1998. His research interests focus on World War I, military personnel, and military technology. Since 2003, he has worked as a historian for the Army Medical Department, including a period as command historian at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. He has written, cowritten, or edited eight books and numerous articles on military history.

NOTES

1. This article focuses on the Army, the largest of the uniformed services and the one with the most experience of draftees. For the U.S. Navy, see Frederick Harrod, *Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899–1940* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978). There is no meaningful history of U.S. Air Force recruiting.

2. Marvin Kreidberg and Merton Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775–1945* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1955), 228.

3. John W. Chambers II, *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America* (New York: Free Press, 1987), 154.

4. Memo, Tasker Bliss for Adjutant Gen, 12 May 1917, Item: 5, Folder: 8591 (microfilm, roll 210), Record Group 165: Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, National Archives at College Park, College Park MD.

5. War Department, *Regulations Governing Physical Examinations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Jul 1917).

6. War Department, *Regulations Governing Physical Examinations, Compiled Rulings through 27 August 1917* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1917).

7. See Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization*, 298–309.

8. Ibid., 262–63.

9. Ibid., 273; Albert Love, *Defects Found in Drafted Men: Statistical Information Compiled from the Draft Records Showing the Physical Condition of the Men Registered and Examined in Pursuance of the Requirements of the Selective-Service Act* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920), 74, table.

10. John Quayle, "Reclamation Camps for the Physically Unfit," *Forum* 58 (Nov 1917): 579–84.

11. For example, Edwin Bowers, "Fitting the Unfit," *Everybody's Magazine* 37-B (Dec 1917): 128–32; "Reclaiming Our Man-Power for War," *Literary Digest* 6 (Apr 1918): 32–33. No evidence has been found that Senator Atlee Pomerene ever actually submitted a bill.

12. See Nancy Gentile Ford, *Americans All!: Foreign-born Soldiers in World War I* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001).

13. See Sanders Marble, "Below the Bar: The U.S. Army and Limited Service Manpower," in *Scraping the Barrel: The Military Use of Substandard Manpower, 1860–1960*, ed. Sanders Marble (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012); Provost Marshal General, *Second Report to the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Selective Service System to December 20, 1918* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 152.

14. Albert Love and Charles Davenport, *Physical Examination of the First Million Draft Recruits: Methods and Results* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 34–41.

15. Franklin Martin, *Digest of the Proceedings of the Council of National Defense during the World War* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1934), 325.

16. Weston Chamberlain and Frank Weed, *Medical Department of the U.S. Army in the World War* (hereinafter *MDWW*), vol. 6, *Sanitation* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1926) 465–70.

17. A. G. Crane, *MDWW*, vol. 13, *Physical Reconstruction and Vocational Education* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1927), 205–16.

18. Ibid., 216. Another 0.4 percent deserted and 0.7 percent died.

19. Capt. Bernard Lentz, "Eradicating Illiteracy in the Army," *Infantry Journal* 17, no. 4 (Oct 1920): 353–56.

20. Mobilization Regulation (MR) 1–5, *Standard of Physical Examination During Those Mobilizations for Which Selective Service is Planned* (Washington, DC: War Department, 5 Dec 1932).

21. MR 1–1, *Procurement and Reception of Volunteers During Mobilization* (Washington, DC: War Department, 27 Mar 1934); MR 1–9, *Reception of Selective Service Men* (Washington, DC: War Department, 15 Jan 1934).

22. MR 1–1, *Personnel* (Washington, DC: War Department, 1 Sep 1939).

23. Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization*, 383.

24. "The Prehabilitation of Registrants–A Plan for Rendering Registrants Fit for Examination and Service," *Journal of the American Medical Association* (hereinafter *JAMA*) 116, no. 16 (19 Apr 1941): 1777–78; "Prehabilitation Program Planned," *Selective Service* 1, no. 5 (May 1941).

25. "Report of Commission on Physical Rehabilitation," *JAMA* 117, no. 3 (1941): 199–200.

26. George Q. Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey, Mr. Selective Service* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 96.

27. Robert Anderson and Charles Wiltse, eds., *Physical Standards in World War II* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1967), 17–19.

28. Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey*, 97.

29. Selective Service System, *Physical Examination of Selective Service Registrants* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 90.

30. Ibid.; Louis Hershey, "Correction of Minor Defects of 200,000 Men To Inaugurate National Rehabilitation Program," *Selective Service* 1, no. 11 (Nov 1941); Leonard Rowntree, "National Program for Physical Fitness Revealed and Developed on the Basis of 13,000,000 Physical Examinations of Selective Service Registrants," *JAMA* 125, no. 12 (22 Jul 1944): 821–27.

31. Methods for administering prehabilitation finally were signed on 17 January 1942. "Physical Rehabilitation of Registrants," *JAMA* 118, no. 5 (31 Jan 1942): 383–85. Selective Service System, *Physical Examination*, 91. For the declining induction physical standards in U.S. forces during World War II, see Anderson and Wiltse, *Physical Standards in World War II*, ch. 2 and apps. A–F, which reprint period physical standards.

32. Rowntree, "National Program."

33. Amy J. Rutenberg, *Rough Draft: Cold War Military Manpower Policy and the Origins of Vietnam-era Draft Resistance* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), 30.

34. Leonard Rowntree, "Correctible Defects at Selective Service Age," *Medical Annals of the District of Columbia* 13, no. 5 (May 1944): 171–72.

35. See data in George Jeffcott, *United States Army Dental Service in World War II* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1955), 37–38, 247–53.

36. Marcus Goldstein, "Physical Status of Men Examined Through Selective Service in World War II," *Public Health Reports* 66, no. 19 (11 May 1951), 587–609; "Report of Senate Committee on Wartime Health and Education," *Journal of the American Dental Association* 32, no. 5 (1 Mar 1945): 270–84.

37. Rowntree, "National Program."

38. Physical fitness advocates tried to use the wartime concern over physical standards and fitness to encourage attention to exercise. C. H. McCloy, "Militant Physical Fitness and Physical Education," *Health and Physical Education* 14, no. 6 (Jun 1943): 313–42.

39. Department of the Army, *Marginal Man and Military Service: A Review* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1965), 64–67. See also Marble, "Below the Bar."

40. The literature on Special Training Units has focused on their place in adult education history. See Ulysses Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1965), 263–65 and Army Service Forces, *Statistical Review World War II: A Summary of ASF Activities* (Washington, DC: Statistics Branch, Headquarters, Army Services Forces, [1946]), 62, 219, 228. See also Department of the Army, *Marginal Man and Military Service*, 76–88.

41. Roy K. Davenport, "Implications of Military Selection and Classification in Relation to Universal Military Training," *The Journal*

of Negro Education 15, no. 4 (Autumn 1946): 585–94.

42. Paula Fass, *Outside In: Minorities and the Transformation of American Education* (New York: Oxford, 1989), 143.

43. One example of a textbook is Rex E. Ballinger et al., "Private Pete Learns to Be a Good Soldier!," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Special Training Unit No. 1, 1944), http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll9/id/904/rec/299.

44. Fass, *Outside In*, 146. The Army made no effort to see if the graduates had received the correct training or to study whether the initial standard (completing the fourth grade) was correct. *Marginal Man and Military Service*, 32.

45. "Hershey Urges Youth Be Trained To Fitness for Military Service," *Selective Service* 4, no. 4 (Apr 1944): 4.

46. Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey*, 51–52, 155–56.

47. Harry S Truman, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Universal Military Training," (address, U.S. Congress, Washington, DC, 23 Oct 1945), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12309.

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49. James Gilbert, *Redeeming Culture: American Religion in an Age of Science* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 104–5.

50. President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, *A Program for National Security, 29 May 1947* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 69–70, 138, 145.

51. "UMT Trainees Gain Weight and Height," *Bulletin of the U.S. Army Medical Department* 7, no. 9 (Sep 1947): 818; Interim Rpt, UMT Experimental Unit, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1 Aug 1947, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

52. "Health Benefits from Universal Military Training," *Bulletin of the U.S. Army Medical Department* 7, no. 6 (Jun 1947): 570.

53. See John Sager, "Universal Military Training and the Struggle to Define American Identity During the Cold War," *Federal History: Journal of the Society for History in the Federal Government*, no. 5 (Jan 2013): 57–74.

54. *Are You Ready for Service?*, David A. Smart (Glenview, IL: Coronet Films, 1951), http://archive.org/details/Starting1951, accessed 16 Feb 2022.

55. "National Manpower Council," *Science* 117, no. 3049 (5 Jun 1953): 617–22.

56. Eli Ginzberg, "Conservation of Human Resources," *Science* 114, no. 2969 (23 Nov 1951): 3; Department of the Army, *Marginal Man and Military Service*, 95–104.

57. National Manpower Council, *A Report on the National Manpower Council* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

58. Gladys R. Kremen, "MDTA: The Origins of the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962," U.S. Department of Labor, 1974, https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/mono-mdtatext.

59. Department of the Army, *Marginal Man and Military Service*, 17–18, 105–22.

60. National Manpower Council, *Improving Work Skills of the Nation, Proceedings of a Conference on Skilled Manpower* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 149.

61. National Defense Education Act of 1958, PL 85–864, 72 Stat. 1581 (1958), sec. 101.

62. The President's Council on Youth Fitness was renamed in 1963 as the President's Council on Physical Fitness, in 1968 as the President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports, and in 2010 as the President's Council on Fitness, Sports, and Nutrition.

63. Rutenberg, *Rough Draft*, 88.

64. Charles Reynolds, "Rehabilitation and Follow-up of Selective Service Men Rejected for Military Service," *Military Surgeon* 90, vol. 3 (Mar 1942): 232–37; Charles Reynolds, "The Medical and Epidemiological Management of Selective Service Men Rejected for Military Service," *Military Surgeon* 92, vol. 2 (Feb 1943): 140–48.

65. Jules Vandow, Jeanne Magagna, Jean Childress, and Paul Densen, "Health Referral Services for Armed Forces Rejectees," *Public Health Reports* 82, vol. 4 (Apr 1967): 305–22. By 1967, less than 9 percent of the medically rejected men received care. From 1 January 1968, the Public Health Service stopped referring men to care, although the states could run their own programs at examination sites. Health of the Army Rpt, Ofc Surgeon Gen, 1969 Supplement, 91–2, Stimson Library, U.S. Army Medical Center of Excellence, Joint Base San Antonio-Fort Sam Houston, TX.

66. Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey*, 228. The data reported to President Kennedy was faulty, not considering those deferred but physically acceptable. Memo, Lewis B. Hershey for Timothy J. Reardon Jr., 22 Aug 1961, sub: Physical Fitness as Indicated by Selective Service Experience, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-094-001.aspx, accessed 16 Feb 2022, Folder: Council on Youth Fitness, February 1961–November 1962, Collection: Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, Series: Departments and Agencies, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, MA.

67. Director of Selective Service, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1963* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1964) 13, 35; Director of Selective Service, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1964* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1965), 12.

68. Ibid., 36, 27. Various proposals for a Youth Conservation Corps were circulating in Congress but would not be approved until 1970. The Youth Conservation Corps was more like the Civilian Conservation Corps, and there was no discussion of it helping the military, even indirectly. See Memo, F. S. Hughes, 1 Apr 1961, sub: Summary and Analysis of Youth Conservation Camps, and related proposals, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHSFLCW-009-010.aspx, accessed 16 Feb 2022, Folder: Legislation: Youth Conservation Corps, 1 April 1961–23 March 1962 and undated, Collection: Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, White House Staff Files of Lee C. White, Series: General File, 1954–1964, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, MA.

69. As the Manpower Development and Training Act was implemented, President Johnson established the President's Committee on Manpower. It was chaired by the secretary of labor and included various cabinet secretaries with an interest in employment and education, and the director of the Selective Service System. Lyndon B. Johnson, EO 11152, "Establishing the President's Committee on Manpower," (15 Apr 1964), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-11152-establishing-the-presidents-committee-manpower.

70. Rutenberg, *Rough Draft*, 83, 88.

71. "Classification Changes Should Be Reported," *Index-Journal* (Greenwood, SC), 15 Feb 1964.

72. Progress Rpt, Task Force on Manpower Conservation to President Kennedy, 11 Oct 1963, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-082-005.aspx, accessed 16 Feb 2022, Folder: Labor: Manpower Conservation Report, 1 November 1963, Collection: Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, Series: Departments and Agencies, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, MA.

73. Michael Beschloss, *Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963–1965* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 242–43.

74. Rutenberg, *Rough Draft*, 88.

75. Edward J. Drea, *McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965–1969*, Secretaries of Defense Historical Series, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011), 265.

76. Conversation, Lyndon B. Johnson with Cyrus R. Vance, 9 Mar 1964 (WH6403.06),

Citation Number: 2427, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidency, Secret White House Tapes, Miller Center, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/secret-white-house-tapes/conversation-cyrus-vance-march-9-1964.

77. Department of the Army, *Marginal Man and Military Service*, 185–86.

78. Memo, James Van Fleet for Elvis Stahr, 26 Mar 1962, www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/069a/JFKPOF-069a-006, Folder: Army, 1962, Collection: Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, Series: Departments and Agencies, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, MA.

79. Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey*, 229.

80. The Surgeon Gen, U.S. Army, *Annual Report of The Surgeon General 1965* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966), 28–29, 42.

81. Conversation, Lyndon B. Johnson with Dick West, 31 Aug 1964 (WH6408.43), Citation Number: 5279, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/secret-white-house-tapes/conversation-dick-west-august-31-1964; Conversation, Lyndon B. Johnson with Robert McNamara, 18 Mar 1964 (WH6403.11), Citation Number: 2538, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/secret-white-house-tapes/conversation-robert-mcnamara-march-18-1964; Department of Defense News Release, 26 Aug 1966, Box II:55, Robert McNamara Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

82. Conversation, Lyndon B. Johnson with Robert McNamara, 13 Aug 1964 (WH6408.19), Citation Number: 4913, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/secret-white-house-tapes/conversation-robert-mcnamara-august-13-1964.

83. Frank Best, "'Sub-Standard' Men May Join the Ranks," *Journal of the Armed Forces* 10, no. 50 (15 Aug 1964): 1, 25; Conversation, Johnson with McNamara, 13 Aug 1964 (WH6408.19), Citation Number: 4913.

84. Drea, *McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam*, 266.

85. Conversation, Lyndon B. Johnson with Robert McNamara, 3 Sep 1964 (WH6409.03), Citation Number: 5449, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/secret-white-house-tapes/conversation-robert-mcnamara-september-3-1964; Department of Defense News Release, 1 Sep 1964, Box II:55, Robert McNamara Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

86. *Special Training and Enlistment Program (STEP) Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, 89th Cong. (26 Jan 1965), 5–7, 15, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-89shrg42506/pdf/CHRG-89shrg42506.pdf. The cost of other programs was much higher; the Job Corps struggled when per-person costs appeared to be higher than tuition to Harvard.

87. Drea, *McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam*, 266.

88. Dwight Marvin, "A Thought For Today: 'Moron Corps,'" *Times Record* (Troy, NY), 18 Nov 1964; Charles Bartlett, "Solving Manpower Needs: Training Camps for Illiterate Can Cut Draft Pressure," *Salt Lake Tribune*, 5 Oct 1965; Drea, *McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam*, 266; Rutenberg, *Rough Draft*, 88–90. Hershey was, unsurprisingly, for the Special Training and Enlistment Program. Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey*, 230–31. Conversation, Lyndon B. Johnson with Robert McNamara, 14 Nov 1964 (WH6411.20), Citation Number: 6350, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/secret-white-house-tapes/conversation-robert-mcnamara-november-14-1964; Conversation, Johnson with McNamara, 24 Nov 1964 (WH6411.29), Citation Number: 6471, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/secret-white-house-tapes/conversation-robert-mcnamara-november-24-1964-0; Conversation, Johnson with McNamara, 9 Dec 1964 (WH6412.01), Citation Number: 6607, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/secret-white-house-tapes/conversation-robert-mcnamara-december-9-1964-0; Conversation, Johnson with Richard Russell, 6 Mar 1965 (WH6503.03) Citation Number: 7026 (8550), https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/secret-white-house-tapes/conversation-richard-russell-march-6-1965; Conversation, Johnson with Russell, 2 Jun 1966 (WH6606.01), Citation Number: 10204, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/secret-white-house-tapes/conversation-richard-russell-june-3-1966.

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90. National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, *In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve?* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1967), 57–59.

91. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), *Project One Hundred Thousand: Characteristics and Performance of "New Standards" Men* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower and Reserve Affairs], Sep 1968), vi, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED031634.pdf.

92. I. M. Greenberg, "Project 100,000: The Training of Former Rejectees," *Phi Delta Kappan* (Jun 1969): 570–74.

93. Health of the Army Rpt, Ofc Surgeon Gen, 1967 Supplement, Examination for Military Service, 1968, 91–96; Health of the Army Rpt, Ofc Surgeon Gen, 1970 Supplement, Examination for Military Service, 1971), 104–5; both at Stimson Library, U.S. Army Medical Center of Excellence, Joint Base San Antonio-Fort Sam Houston, TX.

94. Memorandum of Consideration, Army Board for Correction of Military Records, Docket Number: AR2003087357, 7 Oct 2003, https://boards.law.af.mil/ARMY/BCMR/CY2003/2003087357C070212.rtf.

95. David S. Loughran and Bruce R. Orvis, "The Effect of the Assessment of Recruit Motivation and Strength (ARMS) Program on Army Accessions and Attrition," *RAND Health Quarterly* 1, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 10, https://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/health-quarterly/issues/v1/n3/10.html.

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BOOK REVIEWS



HOW IKE LED: THE PRINCIPLES BEHIND EISENHOWER'S BIGGEST DECISIONS

BY SUSAN EISENHOWER

Thomas Dunne Books, 2020
Pp. x, 387. $32.50

REVIEW BY DANIEL R. HART

"President Truman," answered the congress member from Massachusetts to a question of who should be the presidential candidate for the Democrats in 1952. "Unless," he qualified, "General Eisenhower ran as a Democrat and supported the Democratic program. However, I don't know whether General Eisenhower is a Republican or Democrat."[1] John F. Kennedy's answer to what was then a rather innocuous question provides a revealing insight into both the widespread appeal of the five-star general as well as the aura of mystery that surrounded him.

In *How Ike Led: The Principles Behind Eisenhower's Biggest Decisions*, Susan Eisenhower, the subject's granddaughter, sets out to uncover the traits of one of America's greatest leaders. The 397-page book comprises sixteen chronological chapters (exclusive of an introduction and an epilogue) and includes endnotes, a bibliography, and an index. Ms. Eisenhower is an expert-in-residence at the Eisenhower Institute, a policy strategist, and the author of five books, including *Partners in Space: US-Russian Cooperation After the Cold War* (Eisenhower Institute, 2004).

How Ike Led is hard to categorize; it is not a history, a biography, a memoir, or a book on leadership, though it contains elements of all these categories. It is not strictly a personal paean to a man known first by the author as a beloved grandfather and only second as the man who led the Allied victory in World War II and served two terms as president of the United States. It would be foolish to criticize the at-times hagiographic treatment of the subject, for the strength of the book lies in the personal reflections and anecdotes that aid in understanding both the character of Dwight D. Eisenhower as well as his broad mastery of strategic leadership and long-range thinking. Ms. Eisenhower refers to her book as a "primer" on or "sampler" about her grandfather, but these descriptions seem inadequate given how deftly she has interwoven her childhood musings of the man within the historical context. The book is best described as a sympathetic portrayal of perhaps the greatest American leader of the twentieth century.

"Duty," the author writes of her grandfather, "was woven into his DNA" (72). This characteristic was likely a product of both nature and nurture, as Ms. Eisenhower adroitly details her grandfather's early life as the product of a vanishing America. Born the third of seven sons of a poor, Kansan family of pacificist Mennonites, Eisenhower was a brawny and tough child. Contrary to the later questioning of his intellect, he was an intelligent and engaged student whom his high school classmates predicted would be a Yale history professor. He attended West Point, not out of a desire for martial glory or even a military career, but because the tuition was free. Ms. Eisenhower discounts Eisenhower's ambition during his rise through the ranks of the Army, perhaps because ambition was treated as a character defect, not an asset, in the 1920s and 1930s. However, Eisenhower's determination was tempered with self-assurance and self-confidence that were not braggadocious but comforting. There was never a question of who was in charge. In the days leading up to the D-Day invasion of Normandy, the British commander Trafford Leigh-Mallory urged Eisenhower to cancel the preinvasion airborne operations, citing the heavily reinforced German positions. Eisenhower believed the glider and parachute operations were integral to the success of the operation and rejected the counsel, but he told Leigh-Mallory to put his recommendation in writing anyway. Eisenhower similarly put his rejection in writing, thus protecting Leigh-Mallory, and leaving no doubt about the decision-making process. "It was a personal and public form of accountability," writes Ms. Eisenhower, an act that preserved Allied unity (25–27).

While still an Army general, the apolitical Eisenhower was approached by both parties to be their presidential candidate. As was customary for Army personnel at the time, Eisenhower rarely, if ever, voted, and his politics were unknown. A small "c" conservative, Eisenhower was drawn to the Republican party, but it took some cajoling for him to agree to run. In his inaugural address, Eisenhower advocated a "Middle Way," a theme that resonates throughout Ms. Eisenhower's work. Eisenhower assembled a team of rivals, including the conservative secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, the liberal attorney general, Herbert Brownell, and the moderate ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge. Eisenhower delegated and empowered his cabinet to an uncommon degree, employing a systematic approach to the decision-making process. He was a strategic leader, Ms. Eisenhower avers, rather than an operational one.

Two years after Eisenhower left the presidency, a survey of historians and political scientists ranked the presidents. Now ubiquitous, the poll was a novelty created

by Arthur Schlessinger Jr. in service to his boss, President Kennedy. Eisenhower, the subject of much derision from the Kennedy White House, finished in the bottom third of U.S. presidents, behind Herbert Hoover and Benjamin Harrison. Yet in contemporary polls, he regularly ranks in the top five, among Washington, Lincoln, and the Roosevelt cousins. It is a remarkable ascent, particularly in relation to the records of those in his cohort, for Eisenhower's rise is largely attributable to what he did *not* do. He did not engage militarily in Vietnam despite the pleas of the French; he did not dismantle the New Deal social programs despite the calls from many in his party; he did not overreact when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik or when the Suez Canal exploded into crisis. "Plans are worthless," he once said, "but planning is everything."[2] The seemingly paradoxical statement underscores the centrality of Eisenhower's management focus. Bad decisions are made when all the options have not been vetted fully.

Ms. Eisenhower's portrayal of her grandfather is not without its flaws. Her use of "our" and "we" in reference to America and Americans is unnecessary. She makes a faux pas in stating that the Constitution requires the president to be the head of a political party and the head of state. Instead of investigating or confronting negative incidents in the Eisenhower administration, Ms. Eisenhower elides or generously interprets them. The Central Intelligence Agency–led coups in Iran and Guatemala are omitted entirely. Though she makes the case that her grandfather effectively "took on" Joseph McCarthy, her justification for Eisenhower's appeasement during the 1952 presidential campaign, in which the future president openly ran with the Wisconsin senator, is insincere. Her renderings of the Soviet launch of Sputnik, in which she contends the administration knew exactly what it was doing but was shocked by the public reaction, and Eisenhower's—at best addled, at worse mendacious—response to the downing of a U–2 observation flight, are overly tendentious. The book would have been enhanced by Ms. Eisenhower's embrace and analysis of her grandfather's mistakes.

These are minor quibbles to what is otherwise a delightful portrayal of the thirty-fourth president of the United States. Eisenhower did not have a vision for broad social change as Franklin D. Roosevelt did, nor did he win the internecine war between the Union and the Confederacy and end the wickedness of slavery as Lincoln did. His brilliance was in organizing and leading others. "He was a far more complex and devious man than most people realize," said someone who knew of such things, his vice president, Richard M. Nixon, "and I mean that in the best sense of those words."[3]

NOTES

1. *Meet the Press*, "John F. Kennedy," aired 2 Dec 1951, on NBC.

2. Dwight D. Eisenhower (remarks, National Defense Executive Reserve Conference, 14 Nov 1957), in Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1958), 819.

3. Richard M. Nixon, *Six Crises* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), 161.

Daniel R. Hart earned his bachelor's degree in history and government from Bowdoin College and his master's degree in history from Harvard University. His book on the relationship between John F. Kennedy and Henry Cabot Lodge during the Vietnam War is scheduled to be published in 2023.



THE SECOND MOST POWERFUL MAN IN THE WORLD: THE LIFE OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY, ROOSEVELT'S CHIEF OF STAFF

By Phillips Payson O'Brien

Dutton, 2019
Pp. viii, 531. $30

Review by Larry A. Grant

The latest biography of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy is Phillips Payson O'Brien's 2019 work, *The Second Most Powerful Man in the World: The Life of Admiral William D. Leahy, Roosevelt's Chief of Staff.* According to WorldCat.org, the only other biography of Leahy is Henry H. Adams's *Witness to Power: The Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy* (Naval Institute Press, 1985), which is now three and a half decades old.

The only remaining lengthy, in-depth book related exclusively to Leahy is his memoir, *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time* (Whittlesey House, 1950). Except for a few combined biographies grouping Leahy with other World War II commanders, a few dissertations—none written in this century—and some articles and books with a limited focus, such as Donald Reed's *Admiral Leahy at Vichy, France* (Adams Press, 1968), Leahy seems to be missing from the historiography. This is

odd for a man O'Brien reasonably titles "the second most powerful man in the world."

O'Brien is a professor of strategic studies in the School of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, only a few miles north of the Firth of Forth and fittingly close to the St. Andrews golf club for someone who worked on Wall Street before earning his PhD in British and American politics and naval policy and who now advises European Union organizations. Other works by O'Brien include *How the War was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), in which he reexamines the factors that contributed to the Allied victory in World War II. He also has written articles and several chapters on topics such as foreign relations, logistics, and organizational strategy.

The Second Most Powerful Man in the World comprises thirty-three chapters, the titles of which, like Leahy's career, thread through the key events of the middle of the twentieth century. The book includes several appendixes. It is well-supported by a select bibliography, extensive notes, and an index. The prologue opens the book with the interesting and possibly unfamiliar story that Winston Churchill's first telephone call in Washington in March 1946, as he prepared his famous Iron Curtain speech, was to Admiral Leahy. Churchill wanted Leahy to vet the speech before he showed it to anyone else. It speaks eloquently of Churchill's high regard for Leahy that this master of the English language and consummate political operator called on the admiral to get the speech right.

O'Brien's thesis is that no American military figure did more to shape the Second World War than Admiral Leahy, but when it comes to key American figures from that war, name recognition and movie portrayals are awarded to leaders like General Dwight D. Eisenhower, General George S. Patton, and General Douglas MacArthur. Though he was unquestionably an important figure in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration, few people who are not students of history are likely to have heard of Leahy.

Leahy's appointment as chief of naval operations in 1937, O'Brien writes, "was what Leahy assumed would be the high point of his already distinguished career" (99). However, as O'Brien spends another 350 pages covering in detail, Leahy had more than a decade of remarkable public service to complete before he retired for the second and final time in 1949. Following Leahy's tour as chief of naval operations, Roosevelt appointed him as governor of Puerto Rico from September 1939 to November 1940. After initially considering General John J. Pershing—a choice that was impractical for age and health reasons—for the ambassadorship to Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain's Vichy government, Roosevelt called on Leahy, who served as the ambassador until May 1942. "So uncertain were our relations," Leahy wrote of his appointment in *I Was There*, "that an 'escape route' was kept in readiness at all times, with gasoline and supplies cached along the way should it be necessary for us to leave Vichy unexpectedly."[1] This must have been disquieting for a man entering his late sixties.

Though Leahy did not have to tunnel out of France, it was nonetheless an unpleasant departure that followed his wife's, Louise's, death. After a short break, Roosevelt recalled Leahy to active duty in July 1942, making him chief of staff to the commander in chief. O'Brien writes that the "job was to have two main roles. The first was to preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff," and the second "was to be Roosevelt's most senior military adviser" (178–9). In this role, Leahy was Roosevelt's aide at the major wartime conferences in Casablanca, Tehran, and Yalta, where the structure of the postwar world was fixed. Leahy remained on the job after Roosevelt's death, attending the Potsdam conference with President Harry S. Truman.

O'Brien points out that the new post of presidential chief of staff was not understood by General George C. Marshall and was understood all too well by Admiral Ernest J. King. Marshall, who saw his own influence in the appointment, a notion O'Brien rejects, believed that the post was intended to "coordinate discussion amongst the armed forces, [but Marshall] failed to fully grasp that its defining element was to act as Roosevelt's senior strategic adviser. Ernest King, an aggressive and somewhat paranoid man, did realize that it would lessen his and Marshall's influence with the White House and opposed the appointment" (179). O'Brien notes that Leahy was a skilled operator in Washington and often the key influencer of Roosevelt's policies.

Leahy continued as the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as a presidential adviser under Truman, but "there were noticeable differences from the Roosevelt years. Truman and Leahy were far more formal" (334). As his position diminished, the roles of others grew more influential. Leahy still played an essential role in policy discussions, but increasingly his voice was just one among many others. For example, he was not a member of Truman's interim committee dealing with the atomic bomb. Even so, he took a forceful stand on the question of using the bomb, particularly on whether it should be used without warning.

Leahy opposed using the weapon for two reasons. The first was his mistaken belief that "the bomb [would] never go off," a viewpoint he held "as an expert in explosives" (340). Second, and more importantly, Leahy's opinion, shared with many others, was that the bomb was not needed to win the war against Japan. He believed in mid-1945 that the Japanese already were beaten because of the naval blockade and the effective conventional bombing campaign. Leahy opposed the demand for unconditional surrender and the invasion of Japan in Operation Olympic for the same reasons. Leahy lost the bomb argument, and O'Brien argues that he would have lost the Olympic argument had the bomb failed to work.

After the Japanese surrender, Leahy remained in charge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Cold War got underway before he retired for good in March 1949, two months after Truman's second inauguration and a few months before the famous revolt of the admirals in October 1949. In retirement, Leahy wrote his memoirs and briefly reestablished contact with Truman's administration. Then, after Eisenhower's election, he subsided into years of relative obscurity. Leahy died in July 1959 and was buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

The Second Most Powerful Man in the World sheds light on an American leader whom O'Brien justifiably calls "The Forgotten Man" in the title of his last chapter (437). Given Leahy's lack of public celebrity—and his absolute disinterest in it—it is tempting to label Leahy with the appellation *éminence grise* (gray eminence), as discussed within O'Brien's work. He certainly qualified for the label in terms of being a powerful decision-maker or adviser who operated—by choice—"behind the scenes" (387). However, Leahy was also known for his modesty, devotion to duty, and loyalty. O'Brien's biography amply demonstrates these nuances of character, and it should be of interest to all who want to peer further behind the scenes of World War II.

NOTE

1. William D. Leahy, *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and*

Diaries Made at the Time (Whittlesey House, 1950), 11.

Larry A. Grant retired as a Navy surface warfare officer after twenty-seven years of service. He received a bachelor's degree and a master's degree in history from the University of California, San Diego, and a master's degree in antisubmarine warfare from the Naval Postgraduate School. He edited *Caissons Go Rolling Along: A Memoir of America in Post–World War I Germany* (University of South Carolina Press, 2010) by Maj. Gen. Johnson Hagood and has written on various other military and naval topics, including Starfleet's Prime Directive. He taught history as an adjunct professor at The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina.



SURVIVING THE WINTERS: HOUSING WASHINGTON'S ARMY DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

By Steven Elliott

University of Oklahoma Press, 2021
Pp. x, 238. $34.95

Review by Matthew J. Vajda

Americans have come to know the hardships and triumphs the Continental Army faced during the winter of 1777–1778 at Valley Forge following its defeats around Philadelphia at Brandywine Creek and Germantown. Although Valley Forge has been enshrined in the American psyche, the task of building and maintaining the winter quarters at the location is largely overlooked, including within military histories. Steven Elliott offers scholars an in-depth look at how the Continental Army planned their winter camps, procured supplies, and maintained order and training, all while staying warm, staving off hunger, and keeping an eye on the British movements in Philadelphia. In *Surviving the Winters*, Elliott argues that castrametation, the study of military camps, was a critical component to war-making. Improving shelter and the placement of these camps, in addition to camp hygiene, "proved as important to the Patriots' eventual victory as reforms to drills and tactics" (6). Using George Washington's main army throughout New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania as the focus of his study, Elliott demonstrates how winter quarters were essential to the war experience and how well-maintained camps were "crucial to the welfare of the soldiers" (2).

Elliott's work contends that Revolutionary War scholars rarely have analyzed encampments of the Continental Army, often doing so in passing through a mention of the health and welfare of soldiers in these camps and overlooking the sanitation of these camps. Likewise, even when discussing the British Army in North America, Elliott argues that scholars have failed to mention encampments, and if they do mention them, they do so from a political perspective. When scholars have analyzed camps, many have placed too much emphasis on Washington's Valley Forge encampment during the winter of 1777–1778, often to the point of mythologizing it, and they ignore the other winter quarters. As a result, Elliott rectifies this issue by performing a comparative study of several winter camps as a "critical component of making war." He includes Middlebrook, Morristown, West Point, and New Windsor, in addition to Valley Forge, and analyzes their "logistical, strategic, and administrative consequences," much like the eighteenth-century military writers Elliott studies in his work (3).

Over the course of seven chapters, Elliott examines how military officers within the army, chiefly General Washington, adapted European military doctrine for the war in the American colonies. Each chapter deals with specific problems the army encountered, including the breakdown of military training, disease outbreaks, and supply shortages. The chapters explore the generals' decision-making process in evaluating the positives and negatives of setting up their camps. These decisions often played into the reputation of Continental Army commanders like Horatio L. Gates, Nathanael Greene, and, specifically, George Washington. Under Washington's leadership, the Continental Army underwent several changes to how it would build its encampments. This was partly attributable to Washington. Although he at first adhered to a stricter European camp structure and building, he learned to become more flexible over the course of the war and adapted his quarters to the geography of the region the army had marched to and settled in for the winter. This was primarily because of the issues surrounding the Continental Army obtaining supplies from the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, which could not raise money from the other states to support the army.

Using the diaries and personal correspondence of Continental soldiers, Elliott considers how soldiers responded to these constant logistical headaches and how they remained dedicated to their commanders throughout these crises despite the harsh conditions, the supply problems, and the lack of pay. While the patriot militias are not addressed in detail, given their short-term service within the Continental Army, their service is mentioned in comparison to the Continental soldiers' service. The militiamen provided local defense and thereby were stationed closer to home, but they were ill-disciplined when it came to most military matters. For this reason, the common soldiers in the Continental Army are the primary focus for Elliott, given that their enlistments were longer and can be studied in more detail. Continental soldiers learned to adapt to the current conditions whenever they marched, especially as enlistments expired and new soldiers entered the ranks. Veterans who reenlisted or stayed on for longer terms would act as leaders of the new recruits, showing these green troops the expectations for camp setup, cleanliness, discipline, and duties. Those who remained on the campaign for the duration of the conflict came to understand what was considered standard for the Continental Army when they settled in for the winter, even as they learned the European art of war from officers like Friedrich von Steuben.

Elliott relies on traditional military

sources, including the writings of officers and enlisted personnel, personal correspondence, orderly books, and diaries of officers and soldiers. These works are essential for understanding the thoughts and experiences of those within the Continental Army, and in some instances, the British Army, as soldiers relay this information to their families, other officers, the Continental Congress, and other colonial government officials. The use of English, French, Prussian, and American eighteenth-century military writers also allows scholars to understand the intellectual debates surrounding campaigning and camp building. This highlights the importance how Continental Army commanders like Washington saw military theory and applied these theories to their own armies or adapted them when they did not work out accordingly. One of the most significant contributions Elliott brings to his monograph is his use of historical archaeology, an environmental study, and urban development analysis. He employs these concepts to evaluate how the Continental Army constructed its cabins and how Continental Army encampments directly affected the surrounding environment. This spatial and geographical look, which could have benefitted from maps of camp layouts showing their distance to population centers and the surrounding topography, was essential in determining how camps were positioned strategically and logistically, such as on hills overlooking defendable areas or buttressed against a swamp, stream, or ridgeline to discourage British raids, and in consideration of access to water and food supplies, where camp waste would go, and what would be used as shelters as the army recovered from the campaign. Ultimately, Elliott contends these log-hut cities, as he calls them, were vital to the Continental Army's Fabian strategy, calling them one of the "most important and original contributions made to the art of war" (4, 176).

This monograph is ideal for classes on the American Revolution and War and American Society, in which students can analyze the life of American soldiers while on campaign in greater detail than in survey courses. Elliott's approach significantly bolsters the scholarship on the War for Independence as he places the more mundane parts of campaigning, including taking shelter, at the center of warfare. Elliott could have given more attention to a comparison of the Continental Army's encampments with the British occupations of patriot cities, any clashes guards had with one another, and the ways in which scouts studied the camps and relayed that information to their superiors. Likewise, more emphasis could have been given to some of the other departments, particularly the Northern Department under Philip J. Schuyler and later Horatio Gates, as they dealt with the harsh winter weather much like Washington did. Ultimately, Elliott's study succeeds at proving his thesis, bringing cantonments into the discussion of Army life. Elliott's research opens up paths for serious scholarship in this field, and it is this reviewer's hope that other winter encampments will be written about in future volumes.

Matthew J. Vajda is a PhD candidate in the Department of History at Kent State University and an instructor of history in the Department of Public Services and Security Studies at Notre Dame College in Ohio. He is interested in American history, warfare, and society during the Revolutionary War and in the early republic, as well as espionage and intelligence gathering. His dissertation, *Knowing Your Enemies: Ralph Van Deman and the Origins of American Military Intelligence, 1882–1941*, analyzes Van Deman's role in making military intelligence a central profession with the U.S. Army, a feat which earned him the nickname "the Father of American Military Intelligence."



SOUTHERN STRATEGIES: WHY THE CONFEDERACY FAILED

EDITED BY CHRISTIAN B. KELLER

University Press of Kansas, 2021
Pp. iii, 271. $34.95

REVIEW BY BENJAMIN J. LYMAN

The question of why the United States succeeded and the Confederacy failed in the Civil War continues to provide fertile ground for study by historians and military professionals alike. The vast geography of the conflict, the personalities and leaders involved, and the far-reaching impact of the war still allow for new examinations into the nature and character of war. In *Southern Strategies: Why the Confederacy Failed*, editor Christian Keller and his team of authors, all professional soldiers affiliated with the United States Army War College, approach their analysis of Confederate strategy in the war with decades of experience in the practice and instruction of armed conflict. Their aim is not to settle the debate on why the Confederacy failed in its rebellion but rather to reinvigorate the discussion using military and national security theory. The result is a collection of thought-provoking essays that examine the war through the focused lens of senior military professionals.

In the volume's introduction, Keller defines the primary theoretical construct the authors use throughout *Southern Strategies*.

He describes the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) model as a useful method to analyze how a state "wielded or currently wields its powers at the strategic level" (3). Those acquainted with this model will find this discussion familiar. The uninitiated will find it a helpful primer for the essays that follow, as all six authors use elements of the DIME model in their analyses of Confederate leadership, economics, intelligence, diplomacy, and military strategy.

Keller leads off the collection of essays with an examination of how Confederate generals Robert E. Lee and Thomas J. Jackson developed their professional relationship and explored strategic contingencies during the 1862 Valley Campaign. Keller argues that the timing of the deaths of key Confederate generals, Jackson's chief among them, weakened the military component of the Confederate DIME and, with it, rebel chances for independence. Additionally, Keller posits that even before Jackson's death, the transfer of his command to Richmond in June 1862 deprived the Confederacy of an opportunity to execute a northern strike into a vulnerable United States, which may have yielded war-altering results. Keller's assessment of Jackson's inklings for the strategic offensive provides valuable insight into the rationale behind Lee's later operations in 1862 and 1863.

Exploring the economic component of the DIME model, Eric Johnson focuses on the economic and fiscal policies of the Confederate states. He argues that these policies inhibited the Confederacy's ability to wage a war against an adversary superior across all elements of the DIME. From taxes, to bonds, to monetary policies, Johnson demonstrates that the administration of Confederate president Jefferson Davis made significant decisions early in the war that crippled the Confederacy's ability to fund a long-term conflict. Furthermore, rebel misunderstandings of the demand for Southern cotton on the international market prevented them from capitalizing on sales of the cash crop to purchase arms in the early years of the war before the full implementation of the Federal naval blockade. Johnson concludes that the economic instrument did little to bolster and much to deteriorate Confederate national power.

In an essay that focuses on the 1862 Maryland Campaign, Kevin McCall explores the informational instrument of the Confederate DIME with a close examination of the intelligence component. He argues that information "proved strategically decisive in foiling what could have been a war-winning campaign" (81). McCall asserts that Lee's lack of intelligence during the campaign crippled his decision-making ability, with negative strategic results for the Confederate cause. In this essay, modern intelligence practitioners will find familiar language as McCall examines the Confederate equivalents of modern intelligence disciplines, including human intelligence, communications intelligence, and open-source intelligence. McCall demonstrates how Lee's intelligence apparatus consistently failed in Maryland, especially when the Federals discovered a lost copy of the rebel commander's campaign plan. The subsequent battle at Antietam Creek and the failure of the campaign had strategic repercussions across the rebel DIME, largely because of failures in the intelligence domain.

In the volume's longest chapter, Erik Anderson examines the failures of Confederate diplomacy. He argues that secessionist leaders failed to understand the geopolitical situation in Europe and that Confederate diplomats consistently came up short in promoting the rebel cause and securing international recognition. Anderson grounds the essay well in the power politics of mid-nineteenth-century Europe. He focuses on Confederate diplomacy in the war's early years, when the rebels came the closest to achieving foreign recognition before setbacks made recognition nearly impossible. He demonstrates how Confederate diplomats never synchronized their message with the Davis administration and how they never fully understood the interests of vital European powers, especially Britain and France. The product was a foreign policy that fell short of achieving foreign recognition for the rebel cause, let alone securing concrete assistance.

Chris Compton examines the relationship between boldness and risk in war using Lee and the 1863 Pennsylvania Campaign. According to Compton, Lee's ability to boldly seize and maintain the initiative was integral to his repeated successes against the Federal army in 1862 and 1863. Yet, Compton argues that in Pennsylvania, Lee failed to reign in his boldness within the limits of acceptable risk, resulting in a "devastating strategic-level defeat" at Gettysburg (180). Compton describes the shifting views of Confederate strategy and how Lee viewed offensive action as the best means to achieve the Confederate policy goal of independence. Compton assesses Lee's strategy for its feasibility, acceptability, suitability, and calculation of risk and concludes that "just about everything had to go right at Gettysburg for victory to occur" (210).

In the volume's final chapter, Michael Forsyth examines the oft-overlooked Trans-Mississippi theater. Labeling the Trans-Mississippi as a decisive theater of operations, Forsyth argues that the Confederates failed there "because the Davis administration viewed it as a mere adjunct to other theaters" and thus never identified clear strategic goals or placed capable leaders in command (219). Forsyth examines the shifting, inconsistent, and weak rebel strategies in the Trans-Mississippi over the early years of the war and compares them to the Federals' coherent and competent approach to the region. Forsyth concludes that because Richmond never fully factored the Trans-Mississippi into its strategic design, it failed to understand that losing the region made the rebel heartland vulnerable to the subsequent Federal strikes that extinguished the Confederate bid for independence.

Southern Strategies succeeds in its goal of using national security and military theory to rekindle the debate over Confederate failure in the Civil War. The authors readily admit that the volume does not contain significant new research or radical reinterpretation of the war. This is not a major detriment, as the volume's greater value is in how the authors seamlessly integrate modern theory with historical case studies. In doing so, they demonstrate that a complex coalescence of factors doomed the rebellion to failure. Specialists at the intersection of history and professional military education will find *Southern Strategies* a valuable addition to their collections. The essays within will be of use in courses and instruction on the elements of national power.

Maj. Benjamin J. Lyman is an instructor in the Department of History at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He is a military intelligence officer with experience in tactical and strategic organizations. He attended Dickinson College and received his master's degree in history from the Ohio State University, where he is also a PhD candidate. His research focuses on the experience and impact of military intelligence in the Civil War.



THE OLD ARMY IN THE BIG BEND OF TEXAS: THE LAST CAVALRY FRONTIER, 1911–1921

By Thomas T. Smith

Texas State Historical Association, 2018
Pp. xv, 240. $31.50

Review by Cody R. Schuette

When faced with persistent and increasing threats from border-crossing desperados, usually proud, self-reliant Texans demanded a strong federal response. *The Old Army in the Big Bend of Texas* recounts the two-decade story of the U.S. Army's legendary horse cavalry and its pursuit of Mexican revolutionaries and frontier bandits in the rugged Southwest. To tell this faintly known tale of U.S. Army operations between 1911 and 1921, Col. (Ret.) Thomas T. Smith capitalizes on his experience as an infantry officer and his deep understanding of military and Texas history. Smith mainly relies on monthly regimental and post records, official memorandums, personal letters, and other primary sources to provide an objective, detailed, and chronological account, in historical context, of the U.S. Army's activity in Texas's Big Bend.

After the outbreak of the American Civil War, the U.S. Army almost entirely vacated the Big Bend. However, when the volatile situation south of the border culminated in the Mexican Revolution, the U.S. Army had to return to provide stability and protect the beleaguered townsfolk. When ordered back to Texas in 1911, the horse and mule "Old Army" had to relearn hard lessons of desert operations while transitioning out of the antiquated regimental force structure.

The call for federal action only increased as Francisco "Pancho" Villa's posse and other like-minded bandits continued to steal, vandalize, and murder. Smith describes nearly a dozen of these events, such as the Santa Isabel Massacre and Villa's infamous raid into Columbus, New Mexico. These events prompted General John J. Pershing to lead an expedition to capture Villa and end the border violence. However, in 1917, the eleven-month expedition of 10,000 soldiers failed to provide lasting border stability. Nonetheless, as with earlier border mass mobilizations, this expedition reinforced the need for efficient and sustainable logistics, which General Pershing's American Expeditionary Force applied in the following years in Europe.

Over the next two summers, citizens and cavalry troops faced periodic harassment and the occasional headline-grabbing raids on ranches with residents murdered, buildings torched, and the U.S. cavalry called to pursue. Texas's resiliency continued to prevail with the assistance of local businesses and ordinary citizens. This local support even morphed into the occasional "citizen posse," in which private citizens in their motorized vehicles trailed the horse-mounted cavalry during "hot pursuits" of Mexican belligerents (56). Smith balances these intriguing tales with the stories of the darker side of American actions. He notes the ruthless culture of the Texas Rangers and incidents of extrajudicial revenge killings. Smith also highlights how newspapers propagated aspects of border events that were misleading at best, inaccurate and intentionally inflammatory at worst. These headlines helped to keep the U.S. Army in the Big Bend, exacerbated negative perceptions of Mexicans, and surely aided in provoking vicious acts.

By 1919, the environment and conditions in the Southwest were noticeably different. Having reached an agreement with the Mexican government, Villa and most of his forces largely had abandoned their revolutionary fight, and skirmishes near the border lessened. Smith recounts how the remaining bandits met a more sophisticated U.S. Army, which now benefitted from the technology of the Great War. Most noticeable were the improvements in vehicles, communications, and aviation capability. Regarding aircraft, American planes had increased in lethality with their forward-firing .30-caliber or rear-mounted machine guns that instantly shocked and easily outmatched horse-riding, pistol-shooting adversaries.

Smith subtly incorporates brief mentions of extraordinary tales of American ideals and heroics. Although the Punitive Expedition fell short of achieving its objective, Smith shares how General Pershing offered aid to Chinese migrants caught up in the violence in Mexico and successfully advocated before the U.S. Congress to expedite their citizenship, helping to establish the largest Asian community in San Antonio. Later, Smith details how 1st Lt. James H. Doolittle, future lead aviator of the Doolittle Raid, orchestrated a recovery of a downed American aircraft in Mexico. In this riveting account, Smith describes how after the downed pilot navigated north to safety, Doolittle led a mule packtrain carrying spare parts into Mexico, coordinated air resupply, and flew the repaired DH–4 aircraft back into the United States.

The latter portion of the book contains a detailed chronology of units' deployments in the Big Bend. Although a tedious read for the layperson, this section is rich in unit and operation particulars that offer a wealth of information for those interested in military or Texas history. Thankfully, Smith amalgamates this information in a concise one-page graphic that is especially helpful for readers attempting to follow this intricate story of dozens of U.S. Army units.

Smith does not dedicate much time spotlighting the details of soldiers' daily routines, living conditions, or firsthand experiences, though this, admittedly, is not a stated purpose of the book. He does discuss, however briefly, the brutal climate, unforgiving terrain, and how some soldiers had the luxury—or misfortune—of replacing rudimentary frontier living with lodging at a hotel or ranch with their families in tow. Nonetheless, even with Smith's primary sources coupled with his past research, the book has a void in understanding and appreciating how soldiers coped during these trying endeavors.

Throughout, Smith provides rich details of the U.S. Army's composition, disposition, and major operations. Although this approach can make it difficult to follow the revolving units and the multitude of characters who lead them, those detailed descriptions complement Smith's end-of-chapter

analyses and the broader context of regional, national, and international events. Smith successfully reinforces how the U.S. Army has been a steadfast example of authority and stability, even to individualistic Texas frontierspeople. Overall, this book provides a well-researched and highly informative account of the U.S. Army's involvement in the Big Bend that the casual reader or seasoned historian can enjoy.

Maj. Cody R. Schuette is an active duty Army officer and a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science, a master's degree in national security studies, and a master's degree in public administration. He currently serves as a Functional Area 59 Army strategist.



ARMING THE IRISH REVOLUTION: GUNRUNNING AND ARMS SMUGGLING, 1911–1922

BY W. H. KAUTT

University Press of Kansas, 2021
Pp. xiii, 316. $45

REVIEW BY AUGUSTINE MEAHER

In the Irish nationalist folk song, "Me Old Howth Gun," the singer praises a rifle that was smuggled into the port of Howth past British customs before the 1916 Easter Rising with "you proved a friend indeed when you made the bullet speed."[1] Logistics are a crucial element of any successful military campaign, and most Irish Volunteer operations from 1917 to 1920 were related to obtaining, manufacturing, or transporting armaments. Yet, as W. H. Kautt correctly identifies in *Arming the Irish Revolution: Gunrunning and Arms Smuggling, 1911–1922*, the supply of weapons to Irish nationalists from 1911 to 1922 remains largely unstudied, and the key figures are unknown.

Although the Decade of Centenaries commemorating the century of Ireland's independence and partition has focused primarily on Ireland and the United Kingdom, Kautt begins *Arming the Irish Revolution* by placing the Irish Revolution into the wider European historical context. This is extremely helpful as it positions the reader to better understand the ideological influences on both sides of the conflict as well as possible weapons sources. It is with Kautt's research following the 1916 Easter Rising that *Arming the Irish Revolution* becomes an engaging operational history. Kautt devotes chapters to the functioning of the Irish Volunteers' Quartermaster's Corp, the arms centers which were created to produce armaments, and the foreign arms trade. He concludes with a description of how these logistical operations continued during the truce and into the Irish Civil War. That the Irish Republican Army (IRA) had a well-developed and functioning armaments procurement system is conclusively demonstrated by Kautt.

Kautt's detailed accounts of smuggling and explosives manufacturing are riveting. The manufacturing of weapons is particularly interesting as it was previously unstudied. Kautt's thorough explanation of how civilian industries were used to support the Irish campaign for independence is a valuable new addition to the historiography. Kautt's evidence also reveals how difficult it was for the British authorities to stem the flow of munitions and explosives. This problem would bedevil anti-IRA operations in the Troubles half a century later. Furthermore, Kautt demonstrates that the IRA was a learning organization. Its procurement and production of weapons continually evolved throughout the conflict. Kautt conclusively shows that the IRA was not forced to accept the treaty because it lacked weapons, as commonly has been argued. This is an important addition to the historical debate that will force historians to reconsider the reasons Ireland accepted the treaty ending the war and granted the Irish Free State Dominion status while Northern Ireland remained separate.

The general and the academic reader will enjoy *Arming the Irish Revolution* with its detailed biographical sketches of the individuals involved. The biographies are crucial as gunrunning was dependent on people who were not professionals but volunteers serving a movement. Indeed, the arming of the Irish Revolution was personality-driven, and in this, the logistics of the IRA resemble many elements of the Irish Revolution. These individuals, having been brought out of obscurity, provide us with a deeper and better understanding of how the IRA functioned. Future historians will be able to use *Arming the Irish Revolution* to explore how the logistics efforts intersected with other aspects of the Irish Revolution and subsequent Civil War.

Kautt's penultimate chapter, "Assessment of Republican Arms-Procurement Campaigns, 1918–1921," is unquestionably the best chapter in *Arming the Irish Revolution.* Kautt lays out his criteria for assessing the gunrunning and gunrunners and shows how they succeeded and failed at the tactical and operational levels. This methodological approach will be helpful to historians exploring other revolutions and insurgencies as it establishes a formula that can be used to evaluate the success of other logistical efforts. The statistical charts included elevate *Arming the Irish Revolution* from good to great. They allow the reader to step back and gain a deeper understanding of the scale of the IRA's logistical effort and why the British were unable, given London's unwillingness to treat Ireland as a war situation, to stem the tide.

Despite the impressive research that supports *Arming the Irish Revolution*—there are almost one hundred pages of notes—and the engaging stories that support Kautt's argument, *Arming the Irish Revolution* is not perfect. Each chapter is extremely insightful. However, the chapters do not lead naturally into the subsequent chapter; they end abruptly. An individual chapter could easily be assigned as a course reading, but the general reader may be jarred by this approach. As an operational history, *Arming the Irish Revolution* is excellent, but a reader not well versed in Irish history at times may be unable to place events into the broader Irish and British historical context. Indeed, how the various units Kautt discusses fit into the wider IRA is sometimes unclear.

Nevertheless, *Arming the Irish Revolution* is an excellent book that will be consulted by historians for years to come.

NOTE

1. "Me Old Howth Gun," https://www.musicanet.org/robokopp/eire/howthgun.htm, accessed 1 Dec 2022.

Dr. Augustine Meaher received his bachelor's degree at Georgetown University, his master's degree at Tulane University, and his PhD at the University of Melbourne. He is currently an associate professor of National Security Studies at Air University's Global College of Professional Military Education at Maxwell Air Force Base. Previously, he was an assistant professor at the University of North Georgia and an associate professor at the Baltic Defense College.



ROCK FORCE: THE AMERICAN PARATROOPERS WHO TOOK BACK CORREGIDOR AND EXACTED MACARTHUR'S REVENGE ON JAPAN

By Kevin Maurer

Dutton Caliber, 2020
Pp. xiv, 287. $28

Review by Stephen M. Donnelly

The second Battle of Corregidor (1945) was destined to happen once President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered General Douglas MacArthur to evacuate the island during the first Battle of the Philippines in 1941. MacArthur's senior field commander, Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, was ordered to hold out against the attacking Japanese forces as long as possible. He then would suffer the ignominy of surrender and imprisonment at the hands of an enemy that did not believe in surrender. His troops would pay a terrible price for the loss of the Philippines, dying by the thousands during the Bataan Death March and their subsequent imprisonment. So, Corregidor and the Philippines had to be liberated, and MacArthur had promised that he would return. This necessity was driven by MacArthur's sense of destiny and revenge. His forces were caught flat-footed by the Japanese during the first battle. Most of his planes were destroyed on the ground, lined up like ducks in a shooting gallery for the Zeroes to strafe at will. Even after Pearl Harbor, his forces had not reacted to the fact that the greater danger came from the air, not from earth-bound saboteurs. Caught by surprise and ordered to run away to fight another day while his troops were sacrificed in a holding action, MacArthur would not countenance talk of island hopping and bypassing the Philippines. The islands' capture was not strategically necessary, as they were not within bomber range of the main Japanese islands. Instead, this battle was personal, and the defenders would be wiped out whether strategically necessary or not. This was war in its most elemental form, killing for the sake of killing. More than four thousand (4,497) Japanese soldiers on Corregidor would pay the ultimate price for the Bataan Death March, at the price of 228 American lives, along with 727 wounded. *Rock Force* tells the story of the second Battle of Corregidor and the heroic service members who liberated the island and brought freedom to the people of the Philippines.

An extremely unusual aspect of this battle was that the American forces, who annihilated the Japanese, were outnumbered by almost two to one. Three thousand American paratroopers, reinforced by 1,000 infantry troops, decisively destroyed 6,500 Japanese soldiers. Several factors contributed to this one-sided engagement. Perhaps the most glaring was the fact that even though the Japanese commanders were warned of the possibility of a paratroop attack, they totally ignored the potential in their defensive arrangements. Myopically assuming the main attack would come from the sea, the Japanese aimed all their defensive efforts toward throwing back an amphibious attack. This allowed the paratroopers to accomplish the most dangerous part of their operation, the jump itself, without coming under much direct fire. It also meant that the Japanese inadvertently had ceded the high ground in the center of the island. No defensive positions and no predetermined fields of fire greeted the attackers from the air. Additionally, because the defensive positions all were pointed out to sea, they were ineffective for use against attackers who were now attacking from their rear. The supporting American infantry force did attack by sea, and this is where many of the Allied casualties occurred.

Any parachute drop under fire is inherently dangerous. Still, the Japanese failure of imagination, which led them to ignore the possibility of an airborne assault, allowed it to be a crowning success. The 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment was able to land, organize, and take the high ground with minimal casualties. The Japanese never were able to recover tactically after this impressive feat of arms.

Another important factor in victory was the Japanese penchant for all-out infantry attacks reminiscent of earlier wars. Generals learn lessons from the last war they fought, but the Japanese pretty much had sat out World War I, during which most military tacticians belatedly realized that the machine gun had put an end to the massed assault of entrenched positions. At the turn of the century, Japan had bested Russia and China in separate wars by employing human waves of attackers. A costly though successful tactic before the machine gun gained wide acceptance, it was disastrous during World War II and contributed significantly to the vast Japanese casualties during the war. Outdated tactics doomed the Japanese from their first major encounter of the battle. As 1st Lt. Bill Calhoun saw, "There, to his disbelief, were Japanese Imperial Marines marching up Grubbs Road in columns of four. It looked like a parade or a column of troops during the Civil War. No one was looking for cover" (173). In several coordinated banzai attacks, the Japanese literally marched their troops into withering fields of fire, sustaining thousands of casualties. This effectively destroyed their capacity for

further offensive operations and made the remainder of the battle one of attrition. The Americans nearly annihilated their enemy with a minimum of their own casualties.

The heart of this book is in the stories of bravery, sacrifice, and endurance of the American soldiers who took back Corregidor. Much of the narrative follows the exploits of 1st Lieutenant Calhoun and his paratroops. Pvt. Lloyd G. McCarter, seriously injured while killing dozens of Japanese during a banzai attack, was a good example of bravery in the face of overwhelming odds. McCarter was recommended for a Medal of Honor by Calhoun, but his regimental executive officer initially put him in only for a Distinguished Service Cross because he viewed McCarter as a screw-up. Fortunately, the awards board agreed with Calhoun, and McCarter eventually was awarded the Medal of Honor after the war by Harry Truman.

Full of personal stories of the paratroopers who fought and died during the battle, *Rock Force* recounts the dreams and ambitions of the ordinary soldiers who were forced to do extraordinary things. These personal stories are the heart of any good war story, and they are well represented in Maurer's story of the Rock Force.

Stephen M. Donnelly is a consultant for the life insurance industry. He received his master's of business administration from Western New England University and his bachelor's degree in social science from Westfield State University. He is a frequent reviewer for the *Historical Journal of Massachusetts*.

ON AIR

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(*continued from page 4*)

these units now document Army operations in Poland, Bulgaria, and the Baltic states. CMH is currently working to augment U.S. Army Europe and Africa, V Corps, and rotational units with additional command historians to ensure that deploying forces document their operations. Based on its experience in Eastern Europe, one deployed corps headquarters has realized the relevance and value of staff historical support and has initiated hiring actions for a command historian and a staff archivist. The result of these efforts will be a more complete, useful record of Army operations.

While it may be easy for some Americans to forget what is happening daily in Ukraine, where that nation is engaged in a conflict for its own existence, I recently had an experience that will forever shape how the Army historical program supports this new partner. Over the course of three days in November, I had the singular opportunity to help facilitate a Battle of the Bulge staff ride for twenty-two Ukrainian cadets, who will go on in a matter of months to serve on the front lines in their country's defense. Along with a team from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, another Army historian, who is assigned to a combatant command headquarters in Europe, and I guided the cadets and their cadre across the Bulge battlefields in Belgium to examine small unit leadership and the experience of battle. The cadets conducted team briefings on doctrinal and tactical subjects using their military training, and the historians connected these topics to the historical context of the Battle of the Bulge. This was a life-changing experience for me because it demonstrated the power and relevance of historical programs that are tied to training objectives and targeted to the audiences they engage.

Across the globe, as the world continues to pose complex challenges to our Army, our nation, and our allies, Army historians continue to educate, inspire, and preserve in meaningful ways.

ARMY HISTORY

Call For Submissions

Army History welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 4,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army's history extends to the present day, and Army History seeks accounts of the Army's actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, which should be embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. A manuscript, preferably in Microsoft Word format, should be submitted as an attachment to an email sent to the managing editor at usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

Army History encourages authors to recommend or provide illustrations to accompany submissions. If authors wish to supply photographs, they may provide them in a digital format with a minimum resolution of 300 dots per inch or as photo prints sent by mail. Authors should provide captions and credits with all images. When furnishing photographs that they did not take, or any photos of art, authors must identify the owners of the photographs and artworks to enable Army History to obtain permission to reproduce the images, if necessary.

Although contributions by email are preferred, authors may submit articles, essays, commentaries, and images on readable electronic media (DVD, CD, USB flash drive) by mail to Bryan Hockensmith, Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Ave., Collins Hall, Bldg. 35, Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319-5060.

chief historian's FOOTNOTE

Jon T. Hoffman

FIELD PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE UPDATE (PART 1)

My main task as the chief historian is overseeing the official history publications, so I usually focus these columns on the work of the Histories Directorate. However, the Field Programs Directorate plays an equally important and often much more direct part in bringing history to the Army, so this Footnote and the next will spotlight its activities.

The Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Studies and Support Division continues its mission of providing support to, and covering the history of, HQDA. Its historians are split between Fort McNair and the Pentagon, including one in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army. The division responds to inquiries from the Army Staff and the secretariat and conducts oral history interviews with departing officials. Additionally, it prepares the annual *Department of the Army Historical Summary* and just has wrapped up the fiscal year 2021 volume. Division historians also have undertaken a number of studies on topics of interest to HQDA. Monographs recently completed or underway include histories of the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, the Army Science Board, the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison, and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1. These publications are part of a series that eventually will cover every element of HQDA. Two special studies are in progress. The first, a follow-on to last year's *The United States Army and the COVID–19 Pandemic, January 2020–July 2021*, addresses HQDA's role in the Army response to the pandemic. The other project, about to go into editing and production, covers the first years of Operation Atlantic Resolve and the Army's changing stance in Europe.

The recently renamed Force Structure and Organizational History Division (FPO) continues to do its vital work determining lineage and honors, supporting major Army reorganizations, selecting appropriate designations for new units, reviewing Army general orders and execute orders, coordinating with other agencies on unit awards, and fact-checking congressional resolutions and presidential orders, such as those pertaining to the recent creation of a national monument at Camp Hale, Colorado. Most of these actions come with tight deadlines and high visibility and require a wealth of historical knowledge and great attention to detail. The swap of *organizational* for *unit* in the division's title is designed to lessen confusion for soldiers, who frequently ask FPO for a written history of their unit. While the division's lineage files are extensive, they do not provide the basis for narrative histories, and that is not part of FPO's mission. The division is in the early stages of writing a publication titled *Unit History 101*, which will explain basic historical issues for units and will identify the Army offices (such as FPO, the Institute of Heraldry, and the Awards Branch) that can assist them with various aspects of their heritage.

During the past year, historians from the Force Structure and Organizational History Division and the Studies and Support Division worked together to assist the Naming Commission established by Congress to identify and rename Department of Defense assets that commemorate any aspect of the Confederacy. Center of Military History (CMH) historians identified Army heraldic items that commemorated the Confederacy, examined unit lineages and honors for Confederate ties, and suggested and reviewed new names for installations. In addition, the team prepared two presentations that Charles R. Bowery Jr., the chief of military history, gave to the commission. The directorate's work is evident throughout the three-volume report of the Naming Commission. CMH historians are continuing this effort as part of Operational Planning Team Honor, the Army team charged with devising the plans to implement the recommendations of the Naming Commission.

The Field and International Programs Division (FPF) executed the first Virtual Conference of Army Historians over Microsoft Teams in addition to ongoing virtual iterations of the Functional Community 61 Orientation Course. The division has developed two new staff rides. One, on World War II mobilization, had its debut on 18 November with the senior leaders of the Joint Staff, J–5, Strategic Plans and Policy–Global Integration Division. The 1862 Peninsula Campaign Staff Ride is set for its inaugural run on 17 and 18 March 2023 with one hundred officers from the French War College. A staff ride guide for the latter soon will enter final editing for publication. FPF is working with software developers to create a Unit Historical Officer Distance Learning Course that is scheduled to go live in October 2023. This division also has revived the long-dormant Historian in Residence Program with the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy. Capt. Jonathan D. Bratten of the Maine Army National Guard, having finished a year on the faculty, is now halfway through his twelve months at CMH, where he is working on a number of projects.

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